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Very Special Circumstances-The
Almost Irrebuttable Presumption of
Abuse Under Section 707(b)(2)
by
Laura B. Bartell*
In bankruptcy cases filed under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code,' an
individual debtor turns over the debtor's nonexempt property to the trustee
in bankruptcy.2 The trustee then sells that property' and distributes the
proceeds to creditors in accordance with their respective priorities.4 In most
chapter 7 cases, unsecured creditors receive virtually nothing on account of
their claims.s In a chapter 13 case, by contrast, the trustee does not collect
and sell property of the estate, including debtor's nonexempt property,6 but
the debtor must pay his or her creditors out of future earnings or other future
income7 over the duration of the plan, generally three to five years.8
The centerpiece of the "bankruptcy abuse prevention" aspect of the Bank-
ruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA)9 was the addition to the Bankruptcy Code of provisions dealing
with what Congress called "Needs-Based Bankruptcy"10 and what others
have familiarly called "means-testing."" Through these amendments Con-
*Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. My thanks to Beth Applebaum for her
assistance on this article.
111 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006).
211 U.S.C. § 542(a).
311 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1).
411 U.S.C. § 726.
5See Teresa A. Sullivan et al., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER
CREDIT IN AMERICA 303-04 (1989) (reporting that 87% of chapter 7 debtors surveyed paid nothing to
unsecured creditors from the sale of assets).
l1l U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1) (omitting duties specified in § 704(a)(1) from duties of chapter 13 trustee).
7ll U.S.C. § 1322(aXI).
81l U.S.C. § 1322(d).
'Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23
(2005).
1old., Title I.
"See, e.g., Luke Welmerink, Cleaning the Mess of the Means Test: The Need for a Case-by-Case
Analysis of 401(K) Loans in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petitions, 41 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 121 (2010);
Robert J. Landry, III, The Means Test: Finding a Safe Harbor, Passing the Means Test, or Rebutting the
Presumption of Abuse May Not Be Enough, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 245 (2009); Ned W. Waxman & Justin
H. Rucki, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Abuse: Means Testing is Presumptive, but "Totality" is Determinative, 45
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gress provided that the court may dismiss a chapter 7 bankruptcy case filed
by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts12 if the
granting of relief under chapter 7 "would be an abuse of the provisions of
[chapter 7]."3 In applying the standard of abuse, the court is directed to
presume that abuse exists if the debtor's "current monthly income" (as de-
fined in § 101(10A) of the Bankruptcy Code)14 reduced by certain specified
monthly expenses' and multiplied by sixty is not less than certain thresholds
set forth in the statute.16 If the debtor's income available to pay unsecured
creditors at least equals these levels, Congress has determined that the indi-
vidual debtor should not be able to take advantage of chapter 7, and must
instead file under chapter 11 or chapter 13.
While creating a presumption of abuse, Congress also included a provi-
sion setting forth the standards for rebutting that presumption. Under
§ 707(b)(2)(B)(i):
Hous. L. REV. 901 (2008); Charles J. Tabb & Jillian K. McClelland, Living with the Means Test, 31 S. ILL.
U. LJ. 463 (2007); Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(B), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231
(2005).
2
Alternatively, the court may, with the consent of the debtor, convert the case to one under chapter
11 or 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1).
"311 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1).
1411 U.S.C. § 101(10A) states that "current monthly income"-
(A) means the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives (or
in a joint case the debtor and the debtor's spouse receive) without regard to
whether such income is taxable income, derived during the 6- month period ending
on-
(i) the last day of the calendar month immediately preceding the date of the
commencement of the case if the debtor files the schedule of current income
required by section 521(a)(1)(B)(ii); or
(ii) the date on which current income is determined by the court for purposes of
this title if the debtor does not file the schedule of current income required by
section 521(a)(1XB)(ii); and
(B) includes any amount paid by any entity other than the debtor (or in a joint case
the debtor and the debtor's spouse), on a regular basis for the household expenses of
the debtor or the debtor's dependents (and in a joint case the debtor's spouse if not
otherwise a dependent), but excludes benefits received under the Social Security
Act, payments to victims of war crimes or crimes against humanity on account of
their status as victims of such crimes, and payments to victims of international
terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18) or domestic terrorism (as defined in
section 2331 of title 18) on account of their status as victims of such terrorism.
"sThe deductions are described in § 707(bX2)(AXii)-(iv), which include "the debtor's applicable
monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor's
actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal
Revenue Service for the area in which the debtor resides," § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii), the "debtor's average
monthly payments on account of secured debts," § 707(bX2XA)(iii), and the "debtor's expenses for pay-
ment of all priority claims," § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii).
'l1 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2XA)(i).
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the presumption of abuse may only be rebutted by demon-
strating special circumstances, such as a serious medical con-
dition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed Forces,
to the extent such special circumstances that [sic] justify ad-
ditional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income
for which there is no reasonable alternative.17
The debtor may show such special circumstances only if the debtor "item-
ize[s] each additional expense or adjustment of income"'8 and "attest[s]
under oath to the accuracy of any information provided to demonstrate that
additional expenses or adjustments to income are required."19 Even if the
debtor meets these requirements, the presumption may only be rebutted if
those additional expenses or adjustments to income cause the debtor to pass
the means test (meaning the debtor's income available to pay unsecured credi-
tors is less than the statutory amounts).20
In Part I of this article I discuss the history of the means-testing provi-
sions and the standards for rebutting the presumption of abuse. In Part II, I
look at how courts are actually resolving efforts by chapter 7 debtors to
rebut the presumption created by § 707(b)(2). I found that debtor efforts to
rebut the presumption of abuse are almost always doomed to fail, either be-
cause the debtors fail to satisfy the documentation requirements set forth in
the Bankruptcy Code for establishing special circumstances, or because courts
interpret the standard very narrowly. Finally, I conclude that the rebuttable
presumption of § 707(b)(2) is a safety valve that provides very little safety to
the debtor who fails the means test, and should not be seen as a viable alter-
native to enable the debtor to remain in a chapter 7 case.
I. CREATING A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF ABUSE 2 1
When the Bankruptcy Code was originally enacted in 1978,22 it contem-
plated that a chapter 7 case could be dismissed "only for cause, including - (1)
unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; and (2) non-
payment of any fees and charges required under chapter 123 of title 28."23 In
1711 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i).
1811 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii). The debtor must also provide documentation for the expense or adjust-
ment to income and a detailed explanation of the special circumstances that make such expense or adjust-
ment to income 'necessary and reasonable." 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii)(I) and (II).
'll U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(iii).
2011 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(iv).
2A very complete history of the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005), can be found in Susan Jensen, A Legislative
History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J.
485 (2005).
22Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
2 31Id. § 707, 92 Stat. 2606.
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1981, Representative Evans introduced a bill, H.R. 4796,24 that would have
amended § 109 to make an individual eligible to be a debtor under chapter 7
"only if such individual cannot pay a reasonable portion of his debts out of
anticipated future income."2 5 The bill would also have permitted the court
to dismiss a chapter 7 case upon the motion of any party in interest filed not
later than thirty days after the meeting of creditors if the debtor were ineligi-
ble for relief under chapter 7 pursuant to this new provision.26
The House Judiciary Committee conducted a series of hearings on con-
sumer bankruptcy in 1981 and 1982 in connection with H.R. 4796,27 during
which some of those who testified expressed concern about debtors taking
advantage of the easy discharge afforded by chapter 7 when they could afford
to pay their debts out of their future income over time under chapter 13.28
Following those hearings, when the Bankruptcy Code was next modified in
1984,29 Congress included an amendment to § 70730 to permit a bankruptcy
court to dismiss an individual consumer chapter 7 bankruptcy case for "sub-
stantial abuse."3' However, even under the new provision, there was a statu-
tory presumption in favor of permitting a debtor to remain in chapter 7, and
only the court (and not any party in interest) could move for such a
dismissal.3 2
Upon implementation of a nationwide program of United States trustees
in 1986, Congress was concerned that the United States trustee might be
considered a "party in interest" who would be precluded from moving for
dismissal of a chapter 7 case under § 707(b), and amended the provision again
to permit the United States trustee (but no other party in interest) to bring a
motion to dismiss a chapter 7 case for substantial abuse.33 In 1998, as part of
2 4H.R. 4786, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (Oct. 20, 1981).
2
5
1d. at § 2.
261J. at § 3.
2 7Personal Bankruptcy: Oversight Hearings before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial
Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1981-82).
28See, e.g., Statement of Rep. Hal Daub, id. at 423; Prepared Statement by Commercial Law League of
America, id. at 563-64; Testimony of Eugene Cline, Senior Attorney, Regional Credit Office, J.C. Penney
Co., Inc., Atlanta, Georgia, id. at 753.
29Pub. L. No. 98-353 (1984). The most pressing reason for the amendment was to remedy the consti-
tutional infirmity of the statutory jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 version of the
Code after Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
"oPub. L. No. 98-353, § 312(2).
"Id. The amendment added a new subsection (b) to § 707, which read as follows:
(b) After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion and not at the request
or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual
debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that
the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter.




3 Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 219(b) (1986).
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the Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, 3
Congress added new language at the end of § 707(b) to bar a court from
considering a debtor's contributions to charitable organizations in deciding
whether to dismiss a chapter 7 case for substantial abuse.3 5
Meanwhile, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 36 Congress
established a National Bankruptcy Review Commission to review the opera-
tion of the Bankruptcy Code.37 The Commission held hearings beginning in
1995 and issued its lengthy report on October 20, 1997.38 The report con-
tained 172 recommendations with respect to proposed changes to the Bank-
ruptcy Code, including thirty-four recommendations bearing on consumer
bankruptcy, which were adopted by a 5-4 vote.39  Those consumer bank-
ruptcy recommendations did not include any modifications to § 707 or any
other provision that would compel debtors to file under chapter 13 rather
than chapter 7 if they had the ability to pay creditors out of future income
(means-testing).
The failure of the Commission to include any means-testing provisions
and its failure to amend § 707(b) (or modify the Bankruptcy Code in other
respects to curb abuse) prompted objections from the four dissenting commis-
sioners who believed the majority did not "go far enough to penalize or deter
abuse."40 In a strongly-worded dissent to the Commission's report by the
Hon. Edith H. Jones and Commissioner James I. Shepard, the two commis-
sioners characterized the majority as "deaf to the public debate over and frus-
34Pub. L. No. 105-183 (1998).
35The new language, inserted at the end of § 707(b), reads as follows:
In making a determination whether to dismiss a case under this section, the court
may not take into consideration whether a debtor has made, or continues to make,
charitable contributions (that meet the definition of "charitable contribution" under
section 548(d)(3)) to any qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as
that term is defined in section 548(d)(4)).
1
6Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106, 4147-50 (1994).
"Id. at § 603. The duties of the Commission were described as follows:
The duties of the Commission are-
(1) to investigate and study issues and problems relating to title 11, United States
Code (commonly known as the "Bankruptcy Code");
(2) to evaluate the advisability of proposals and current arrangements with respect
to such issues and problems;
(3) to prepare and submit to the Congress, the Chief Justice, and the President a
report in accordance with section 608; and
(4) to solicit divergent views of all parties concerned with the operation of the
bankruptcy system.
3 8See REPORT OF THE NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS
(Oct. 20, 1997) ("REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT").
39 d.
4 0Recommendations for Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law by Four Dissenting Commissioners,
REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, Vol. I, ch. 5, at 3.
2017) 397
398 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
tration with this nation's bankruptcy system."41 These dissenters
recommended that § 707(b) be amended to "require that the court dismiss or
convert the case of a debtor who has filed for Chapter 7 if .. . it is found that
the debtor has the ability to repay a portion of his debts [suggesting that an
appropriate amount might be 10% of unsecured debts over five years] in
Chapter 13."42 They also proposed institution of a "presumptive income ceil-
ing for the availability of Chapter 7 relief" in the absence of "extraordinary
and compelling circumstances."43 Circumstances justifying resort to chapter
7 "should include no less than serious and costly medical or health conditions;
unique family circumstances (large number of dependents); being a fraud vic-
tim; or being out of work and unemployable for a sustained period of time."44
Even before the Commission issued its final report, Representatives Mc-
Collum and Boucher introduced a bill in the House of Representatives, H.R.
2500, to implement amendments to the Bankruptcy Code to further so-called
"needs based bankruptcy" reforms.45 Called the "Responsible Borrower Pro-
tection Bankruptcy Act,"4 6 the bill would have amended § 109 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to make certain individuals (and their spouses in joint cases)
ineligible for chapter 7 if they had:
(1) "current monthly income" (defined to be the average
monthly income received in the six months prior to the
date of determination) of 75% or more of the national
median family income for a family of the same size,
(2) projected monthly net income (determined by sub-
tracting from current monthly income expense al-
lowances under the Internal Revenue Service National
Standards, Local Standards and Other Necessary Ex-
penses, average monthly payments on secured debt and
average monthly payments on priority claims) of at least
$50, and
(3) projected monthly net income sufficient to repay 20% or
more of unsecured non-priority claims over five years.47
The bill would have permitted a prospective debtor to establish that "ex-
traordinary circumstances" required allowance of additional expenses in com-
puting projected monthly net income by filing a written statement itemizing
41
Hon. Edith H. Jones & Commissioner James I. Shepard, Additional Dissent to Recommendations for






"H.R. 2500,105th Cong. 1st Sess. § 101 (Sept. 18, 1997).
46Id. at § 1(a).
47Id. at § 101.
(Vol. 91
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the additional expenses and describing the extraordinary circumstances re-
quiring their allowance, accompanied by a sworn statement of the debtor
with respect to its accuracy.48 No illustrations of "extraordinary circum-
stances" were provided in the bill.
Shortly after the Commission issued its report, Senator Grassley intro-
duced a Senate bill, S. 1301, which had the same objective.49 The bill pro-
posed amending § 707 in three major ways. First, it would allow any party
in interest to seek conversion or dismissal of a chapter 7 case (not just the
court and the United States trustee). Second, it would change the standard
for conversion of a chapter 7 case from "substantial abuse" to "abuse." Third,
it would require the court to consider (in determining whether the granting
of relief under chapter 7 would be an abuse of that chapter) whether "the
debtor could pay an amount greater than or equal to 20 percent of [non-
priority] unsecured claims."5o
After both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees held hearings on
the report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Representative
Gekas introduced another bill, H.R. 3150, to implement "needs-based bank-
ruptcy" reforms, as well as business bankruptcy amendments.5' This bill in-
corporated the substance of H.R. 2500, and proposed amendments to the
eligibility requirements of § 109 to limit access to chapter 7 based on ability
to pay creditors (measured by median income, projected monthly net income,
and ability to pay at least 20% of unsecured non-priority claims).52
Representatives Nadler, Conyers and Hilliard introduced their own bill,
H.R. 3146,5 which did not include any sort of means test, but would also
modify the standard for dismissal in § 707(b) from "substantial abuse" to
"abuse." The bill would have required that the court consider a chapter 7
case to be abusive "if, after providing a reasonable standard of living for the
debtor and the debtor's dependents that is not excessive, . . . the debtor is
able to pay the debtor's unsecured nonpriority debts as they come due or to
pay them in full over a 36-month chapter 13 plan, and the court after consid-
eration of all the circumstances finds the case to be an abuse of this chap-
ter."5 4 The bill would have immunized from motions to dismiss any debtor
whose household income did not exceed $60,000 (adjusted upward for each
household member exceeding 4).55
481d.
49S. 1301, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. (Oct. 21, 1997).
'old. at § 102.
5 1H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. (Feb. 3, 1998). The bill was cosponsored by Representatives
McCollum, Boucher and Moran.
s2Id. at § 101.
"H.R. 3146, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. (Feb. 3, 1998).
'
4
1d. at § 8.
"Id.
2017) 399
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The House Judiciary Committee marked up H.R. 3150 and reported it
out of committee as amended in May 1998.56 The only change from the
proposed limitations on eligibility in § 109 from those proposed by H.R.
2500 and the originally-introduced H.R. 3150 was raising the median income
level for purposes of determining whether the debtor had income available to
pay creditors (and therefore was barred from chapter 7) from 75% of the
national median family income to "the highest national median family income"
for a family of the same size.57 The House of Representatives passed the bill,
as amended, on June 10, 1998, 5 and sent it to the Senate for consideration.
Meanwhile, the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the
Courts of the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on S. 1301 and fa-
vorably reported the bill, as marked up, to the Senate Judiciary Committee,59
which in turn favorably reported the bill, as further marked up, to the Sen-
ate.60 The major change in the means-testing provisions from those included
in the bill at the time of its introduction was a new § 707(b)(5) which would
exempt debtors from creditor-initiated motions under § 707(b) if the debtor
had a monthly total income equal to or less than the national median family
income for a family of the same size.61 The Senate replaced the text of H.R.
3150 with that of S. 1301, and passed the bill on September 23, 1998.62 The
House refused to accept the Senate version of H.R. 3150, and the two bodies
sent representatives to conference to attempt to resolve their differences.
The conference issued its report on October 7, 1998.6 With respect to
the means test, the conference committee stated in its joint explanatory state-
ment as follows:
The House version contained a pre-filing formula to steer
debtors with repayment capacity into Chapter 13 repay-
ment plans. The Senate bill directed bankruptcy judges to
consider the repayment capacity of debtors who had filed in
Chapter 7 bankruptcy to determine whether they were ap-
propriately filed. The compromise combines the best aspects
of both approaches. It adopts the procedural approach of the
Senate bill directing bankruptcy judges to consider repay-
16H.R. REP. No. 105-540, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. (1998).
"Id. at § 101. In addition, as under H.R. 2500, the debtor was barred only if the debtor had projected
monthly net income greater than $50 and projected monthly net income sufficient to repay at least 20% of
non-priority unsecured claims over five years under chapter 13. Id.
5"144 CONG. REc. H4442 (daily ed. June 10, 1998).
59S. REP. No. 105-253, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. 32 (July 21, 1998).
MId. at 34.
"Id. at 3-4. This was inserted by an amendment proposed by Senator Durbin when the bill was in the
Subcommittee. Id. at 31.
62144 CONG. REc. S10767 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1998).
6 3H.R. REP. No. 105-794, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. (Oct. 7, 1998).
(Vol. 91
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ment capacity, while instructing that such repayment capac-
ity shall be presumed by the judge if the individual meets
certain bright-line standards for measuring such repayment
capacity. This approach preserves the right of a debtor in
bankruptcy to have a judge review his or her individual case
so that the debtor's unique circumstances could be taken
into account.64
The text of the amended version of H.R 3150, like S. 1301, implemented
the means test through modification of § 707(b), rather than § 109. But in-
stead of merely requiring the court to consider whether the debtor could pay
at least twenty percent of his or her non-priority unsecured claims in assess-
ing whether the granting of relief under chapter 7 would be an abuse, as
under S. 1301, the new H.R. 3150 for the first time required the court to
presume that abuse existed if the debtor failed the means test. This new
presumption of abuse would be triggered if the debtor's current monthly in-
come65 less certain monthly expense deductions,66 multiplied by sixty (to re-
flect a five-year chapter 13 plan), was not less than the lesser of twenty-five
percent of the debtor's non-priority unsecured claims or $5,000.67
The presumption of abuse could be rebutted "only be demonstrating ex-
traordinary circumstances that require additional expenses or adjustment of
641d. at 121.
65
"Current monthly income" was to be defined as "the average monthly income from all sources de-
rived which the debtor, or in a joint case, the debtor and the debtor's spouse, receive without regard to
whether it is taxable income, in the 180 days preceding the date of determination, and includes an amount
paid by anyone other than the debtor or, in a joint case, the debtor and the debtor's spouse, on a regular
basis to the household expense of the debtor or the debtor's dependents and, in a joint case, the debtor's
spouse if not otherwise a dependent." Id. at § 102(a) (proposed § 101(10A)). The definition closely
tracks that included in the House version of H.R. 3150.
'The deductions were those described in clauses (ii), (iii) and (iv) of proposed § 707(b)(2)(A), which
were the following:
(ii) The debtor's monthly expenses shall be the applicable monthly expenses under
National Standards, Local Standards, and Other Necessary Expenses allowance (ex-
cluding payments for debts) issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the area in
which the debtor resides, as in effect on the date of the entry of the order for relief,
for the debtor, the dependents of the debtor, and the spouse of the debtor in a joint
case, if the spouse is not otherwise a dependent.
(iii) The debtor's average monthly payments on account of secured debts shall be
calculated as the total of all amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured
creditors in each month of the 60 months following the date of the petition, and
dividing that total by 60 months.
(iv) The debtor's expense for payment of all priority claims (including priority child
support and alimony claims), which shall be calculated as the total amount of debts
entitled to priority, and dividing the total by 60 months.
Id. Similar deductions were included in the definition of"projected monthly net income" in H.R. 2500, and
were incorporated into the provisions of the House version of H.R. 3150.
"Id. (proposed § 707(bX2)(A)(i)).
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current monthly total income."68 The debtor would be required to itemize
and document each additional expense or adjustment to income and provide a
detailed explanation of the extraordinary circumstances making the expenses
"necessary and reasonable."69 Both the debtor and the debtor's attorney
would be required to attest under oath to the accuracy of that information,
and the presumption would be rebutted only if the additional expenses or
adjustment to income caused the debtor to pass the means test.70
Although, consistent with S. 1301, any party in interest could bring a
motion to dismiss or convert a chapter 7 case under the modified H.R.
3150,71 the conference committee included the new § 707(b)(5) from S. 1301,
which provided that only the judge, the United States trustee or a bank-
ruptcy or panel trustee could bring such a motion if the debtor had a current
monthly total income equal to or less than the national median household
monthly income for a household of the same size.72
The House promptly passed the conference report,7 3 but the Senate did
not take action on the conference report before the end of the congressional
session. Soon after the beginning of the 106th Congress, Representative
Gekas introduced H.R. 833,74 which (with respect to the means test) was
virtually identical to the conference report on H.R. 3150 which had passed
the House in the 105th Congress.75 When H.R. 833 emerged from the
House Judiciary Committee, the bill included some modifications to the
means test itself, most notably in establishing that if the debtor's available
income met or exceeded a fixed number ($6,000), abuse of chapter 7 would be
established without regard to the percentage of debtor's non-priority un-
secured debts could be paid.76 The only changes to proposed § 707(b)(2)(B),
allowing rebuttal of the presumption, were to make clear that debtor's de-
tailed explanation with respect to extraordinary circumstances could include
both additional expenses and adjustments to income, and to remove the re-
quirement that debtor's attorney attest under oath to the accuracy of the
information provided to support an assertion that extraordinary circum-
stances justified an adjustment of income or additional expenses in the
computation.77




71Id. (amended § 707(b)(1))
721Id. (proposed § 707(b)(5)).
73144 CONG. REC. H10239-40 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998).
7 4H.R. 833, 106th Cong. 1st Sess. (Feb. 24, 1999).
7Id. at § 102(a)(2) (proposed § 707(b)(2)).
76H.R. REP. No. 106-123, 106th Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 1, § 102(a)(2) at 5 (April 29, 1999) (proposed
§ 707(b)(2)(A)).
"Id. (proposed § 707(b)(2)(B)).
(Vol. 91402
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The bill passed the House on May 5, 1999,78 and was sent to the Senate.
In the meantime, Senator Grassley had introduced S. 625, the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1999.79 The version of the means test included in this bill
returned to the approach of presuming abuse if the debtor's available income
to pay non-priority unsecured claims over five years at least equaled twenty-
five percent of those claims, or $15,000, whichever is less.80 The Senate bill
modified the provisions of proposed § 707(b)(2)(B), permitting rebuttal of the
presumption of abuse "by demonstrating special circumstances that justify
additional expense or adjustments of current monthly total income."81 The
purpose of this provision was "to protect debtors from rigid and arbitrary
application of a means-test," and the Senate Judiciary Committee intention-
ally rejected the "extraordinary circumstances" standard that had been in-
cluded in the conference report on H.R. 3150 "to provide a different standard
of when a debtor may overcome the presumption of abuse."82 However, the
Committee emphasized that the "special circumstances" test was intended to
"establish a significant, meaningful threshold which a debtor must satisfy in
order to receive the preferential treatment."8 3 The Senate Report also stated:
The debtor's ability to overcome the presumption of abuse
must be based solely on financial considerations (i.e., adjust-
ments to income or expenses required by special circum-
stances) and not of factors unrelated to a chapter 7 debtor's
ability to repay his or her debts. The Committee believes
that the relief sought by a debtor who files for bankruptcy is
financial in nature and the debtor's right to obtain preferen-
tial relief under the special circumstances provision should be
assessed based on financial considerations only. In addition,
special circumstances adjustments must not be used as a con-
venient way for debtors to choose a more expensive lifestyle.
The special circumstances provision must be reserved only
for those debtors whose special circumstances require adjust-
ments to income or expenses that place them in dire need of
chapter 7 relief.84
As was true for the "extraordinary circumstances" standard in H.R. 3150,
the debtor was required to itemize each item of expense or adjustment to
78145 CONG. REC. H2654 (daily ed. May 5, 1999).
79S. 625, 106th Cong. 1st Sess. (Mar. 16, 1999).
sold. § 102(aX2) (proposed § 707(b)(2)(A)).
81Id. (proposed § 707(bX2)(B)).




AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
income and provide documentation and a detailed explanation of the ex-
traordinary circumstances making any expenses necessary and reasonable.85
Both the debtor and the debtor's attorney were required to attest under oath
to the accuracy of the information provided, and the presumption would not
be rebutted unless the additional expenses or adjustment to income caused
the debtor to pass the means test.8 6
The Senate replaced the text of H.R. 833 with the text of S. 625, and
passed H.R. 833 on Feb. 2, 2000.87 The Senate version of H.R. 833 was
dramatically different from the bill that passed the House, and the Senate was
unlikely to support a motion to send the bill to conference with the House.
As a result of informal conference negotiations, a compromise bill, S. 3186,
was introduced by Senator Grassley,88 and incorporated into an unrelated
bill, H.R. 2415, as to which the Senate had already agreed to go to confer-
ence, to circumvent a filibuster threat from Senator Wellstone.89 In Senator
Grassley's bill, the threshold for the presumption of abuse was changed to
"the lesser of - (I) 25 percent of the debtor's nonpriority unsecured claims in
the case, or $6,000, whichever is greater; or (II) $10,000."9o The bill retained
the Senate term of "special circumstances" for rebutting the presumption of
abuse, but inserted an additional limitation on the concept. Under the
Grassley bill, the special circumstances would have to "justify additional ex-
penses or adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no reason-
able alternative."9' No explanation for the new language was provided. The
bill deleted the requirement that the debtor's attorney attest under oath to
the accuracy of information supporting the assertion of special circum-
stances.92 Those provisions were unchanged in the bill that emerged from
conference,93 and both the House94 and Senate95 subsequently passed the
conference report for what was then called the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
2000. On December 19, 2000, President Clinton vetoed the bill by declining
to sign it into law within ten days while Congress was adjourned.96
Shortly after the 107th Congress convened in January 2001, Representa-
tive Gekas introduced H.R. 333, which was virtually identical to the confer-
a5S. 621, § 102(a)(2) (proposed § 707(b)(2)(B)).86
Id.
17146 CONG. REc. S255 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2000).
'S. 3186, 106th Cong. 2d Sess. (Oct. 11, 2000).
"See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. LJ. 485, 535 (2005).
IS. 3186, 106th Cong. 2d Seas. § 102(a)(2) (proposed § 707(b)(2)(A)).
"Id. (proposed § 707(bX2)(B)(i)) (emphasis supplied).
92Id. (proposed § 707(bX2)(B)(iii)).
"See H.R. REP. No. 106-970, 106th Cong. 2d Sess. (Oct. 11, 2000), at 7-9.
94146 CONG REC. H9840 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2000).
9sl46 CONG. REc. S11730 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2000).
56see U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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ence report that had been vetoed a month earlier.97 At the same time,
Senator Grassley introduced S. 220, also virtually identical to the conference
report.98 The thresholds for abuse, and the terms of the requirements to
rebut the presumption, remained unchanged from those in the conference re-
port. The House passed H.R. 333 on March 1, 2001.99 After Senate Judici-
ary Committee hearings on S. 220,100 Senator Grassley introduced and placed
in the Senate calendar a revised bill, S. 420,101 on March 1, 2001 and the
Senate passed S. 420 on March 15, 2001.102 Because the Senate had passed a
separate bill rather than taking up H.R. 333 and replacing its text with that
of S. 420, neither bill was ready for conference to reconcile differences. In
July 2001, the Senate replaced the text of H.R. 333 with the text of S. 420,
and passed the amended bill. 03 The bill was then sent to conference to rec-
oncile differences in H.R. 333 between the House and Senate versions. The
conference committee met over the course of many months to deal with dif-
ferences on the bill; no changes to the threshold figures for the means test or
the language on rebutting the presumption of abuse were made. The confer-
ence report was submitted on July 26, 2002.104
For procedural reasons the House was not able to vote on the conference
report,05 but Representative Gekas introduced a new bill, H.R. 5745, which
incorporated all the text of the conference report with the exception of lan-
guage involving abortion protesters and a provision authorizing additional
bankruptcy judgeships.'06 The language of the new bill was inserted into
H.R. 333 and passed by the House on November 14, 2002.107 However, the
Senate adjourned without considering the revised H.R. 333.
As the 108th Congress began, Representative Sensenbrenner introduced
H.R. 975, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2003.108 The language related to the figures establishing a presumption of
abuse and the requirements for rebutting that presumption was unchanged
from that included in H.R. 5745. The bill passed the House on March 19,
97H.R. 333, 107th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 31, 2001).
9"S. 220, 107th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 30, 2001).
'147 CONG. REc. H600 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2001).
'"S. Hrg. No. 107-195, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, Haring Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, 107th Cong. 1st Sess., Serial No. J-1072 (Feb. 8, 2001).
10 1S. 420, 107th Cong. 1st Sess. (Mar. 1, 2001).
102147 CONG. REc. S2379 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2001).
103147 CONC. REc. S7742 (daily ed. July 17, 2001).
104H.R. REP. No. 107-617, 107th Cong. 2d Sess. (July 26, 2002).
05
See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2005, 79 Am. BANKR. LJ. 485, 557-558 (2005).
106H.R. 5745, 107th Cong. 2d Sess. (Nov. 14, 2002).
107148 CONG. REc. H8876 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002).
05H.R. 975, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (Feb. 27, 2003).
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2003.109 When the Senate seemed disinclined to consider H.R. 975, the
House replaced the text of S. 1920, a bill dealing with the proposed extension
of chapter 12, with that of H.R. 975 and passed the amended S. 1920.110
However, the Senate failed to deal with the amended S. 1920 either, and the
bill died with the end of the 108th Congress.
Senator Grassley introduced S. 256, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 on February 1, 2005,111 which con-
tained proposed amendments to § 707(b) that were identical to those in-
cluded in H.R. 975. The only change to the means-testing language made by
the Senate Judiciary Committee during its mark-up was the addition of a
sentence specifying that the debtor's expenses used in computing the pre-
sumption of abuse "shall include reasonably necessary health insurance, dis-
ability insurance, and health savings account expenses for the debtor, the
spouse of the debtor, or the dependents of the debtor."ll2
The Senate considered the bill over the course of ten days, rejecting
twenty-four amendments and accepting eight."' One of the amendments
that was accepted was a response to a failed amendment proposed by Senator
Durbin, which would have made the presumption of abuse under
§ 707(b)(2)(A)-(C) inapplicable to servicemembers or veterans or their
spouses."4 Senator Sessions dismissed the need for such an amendment, say-
ing it was not needed:
The bill contains a rebuttal to this means test application
when a court finds special circumstances. These are the ones
I think we are discussing. A special circumstance that a mili-
tary member could assert under this bill as it now exists -
this bankruptcy bill - would include the fact that their in-
10149 CONG. REc. H2099-2100 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2003).
110150 CONG. REC. H218-19 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2004).
illS. 256, 109th Cong. 1st Sess. (Feb. 1, 2005).
1 12 S. 256, § 101(a)(2) (proposed § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)), Calendar No. 14.
n.See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. LJ. 485, 563-564 (2005).
11
4
Amendment No. 16 to S. 256, 151 CONG. REc. S1821 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005), provided, with
respect to the means test, that:
Subparagraphs (A) through (C) [of § 707(b)(2)] shall not apply, and the court may
not dismiss or convert a case based on any form of means testing, if - (i) the debtor
or the debtor's spouse is a servicemember (as defined in section 101 of the Ser-
vicemembers Civil Relief Act (50 App. U.S.C. 511(1))); (ii) the debtor or the
debtor's spouse is a veteran (as defined in section 101(2) of title 38, United States
Code); or (iii) the debtor's spouse dies while in military service (as defined in sec-
tion 101(2) of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50 App. U.S.C. 511(2))).
Senator Durbin amended the proposed amendment o insert the phrase "and the indebtedness occurred in
whole or in part while they were on active military duty" at the end of clause (ii) before the amendment
was rejected. 151 CONG. REC. 1828 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005).
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come dropped in recent months due to a call to active duty
or there have been excessive expenses arising as a result of
being called to active duty. That assertion would keep the
means test from applying to the military debt. No special
exemption, it would appear, would be necessary for military
members on this basis because a call to active duty that
causes a drop in income, to me, would be clearly a special
circumstance. The bill currently contemplates that, al-
though I think, frankly we could explicitly state that as a
mandatory circumstance."5
Senator Sessions then proposed his own amendment to insert after the
words "special circumstances" in § 707(b)(2)(B) of S. 256 the words ", such as
a serious medical condition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed
Forces, to the extent such special circumstances."116 The purpose of the
amendment was to "clarify the safe harbor" for debtors subject to these types
of events.117 Senator Sessions explained:
I believe . . . that we can be more explicit in the legislation
and make sure that soldiers, certain persons with medical
conditions, and veterans with low income can qualify under
the safe harbor of the bill. I am offering an amendment
which clarifies that these individuals who may fall under the
special circumstances provisions of the bill are explicitly al-
lowed to be covered under the special circumstances provi-
sions of the bill to give them certain advantages."8
Senator Biden, in supporting the Sessions amendment (and opposing the
Durbin amendment), characterized the Sessions amendment as:
mak[ing] it crystal clear that [ ] special circumstances in-
clude service in the armed forces - if that service puts you
into a situation where you are unable to pay your legal
debts. That can happen to someone called up in the reserve,
and it is precisely why that category of special circumstances
was put into the bill in the first place."
No Senator speaking either in favor of or in opposition to the Sessions amend-
ment suggested that the inclusion of language expressly singling out soldiers
and veterans in the "special circumstances" language was intended to limit
11151 CONG. REc. S1827 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005).
"'Amendment 23 to S. 256, 151 CONG. REc. S1849 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005).
" 7 d.
"'151 CONG. REC. S1845 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005).
"'151 CONG. REc. S1848 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005).
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special circumstances to ones that were similar in nature to those experienced
by those soldiers and veterans. The Sessions amendment passed,120 and the
Durbin amendment failed.121 (Senator Durbin subsequently successfully pro-
posed an amendment to make the means test inapplicable to disabled veterans
under certain circumstances.)122
The Senate passed S. 256, as amended, on March 10, 2005.123 In his final
remarks on the bill, Senator Grassley emphasized that the means test "is fair
and flexible enough to take into account all the unique circumstances a debtor
and his family face."'24 In particular,
[t]he bill has a safeguard that will allow judges to consider
extenuating circumstances in each bankruptcy case. After
determining this means test calculation, the judge can then
take any "special circumstances" into consideration before
making a decision to shift the debtor into chapter 13. This
will allow judges to consider cases where catastrophic ill-
nesses or other unexpected financial calamities that have im-
pacted a family or individual to the point where their debts
are too heavy a loan to carry. This provision made many of
the amendments considered on this bill redundant . . . . In
addition to this safeguard, I supported an amendment to the
bill that clarified the circumstances that might be considered
by a judge. That language provided specific examples a judge
might consider including "a serious medical condition or a
call to order to active duty in the armed forces." I voted for
this amendment because it provided an improvement, in the
form of clarity on special circumstances.12 5
The House Judiciary Committee marked up S. 256 and reported the bill
to the House without adopting any amendments.126 The House considered
120151 CONG. REG. 81853-1854 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005).
121151 CONG. REG. 81854 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005).
12 2Amendment No. 112, 151 CONG. REG. S2139 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2005), inserted a new
§ 707(b)(2)(D) which provided that:
Subparagraphs (A) through (C) shall not apply, and the court may not dismiss or
convert a case based on any form of means testing, if the debtor is a disabled vet-
eran (as defined in section 3741(1) of title 38), and the indebtedness occurred pri-
marily during a period during which he or she was - (i) on active duty (as defined in
section 101(d)(1) of title 10); or (ii) performing a homeland defense activity (as
defined in section 901(1) of title 32).
The amendment was unanimously approved. 151 CONG. REG. S2427 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005).
"151 CONG. REG. S2474 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005).
124151 CONG REG. S2469 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005).
123151 CONG. REG. S2470 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005).
1 26H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, 109th Cong. 1st Sess. (Apr. 8, 2005). Among the proposed amend-
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the bill pursuant to a House Resolution that did not permit any amend-
ments,127 and passed S. 256 on April 14, 2005.128 President George W. Bush
signed the bill into law on April 20, 2005.129
II. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES - AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
In trying to determine how courts deal with the rebuttable presumption
of abuse created by § 707(b)(2), as amended by BAPCPA, I searched for all
cases since 2005 in which the trustee filed a motion to dismiss based on the
presumption of abuse, and the debtor sought to rebut the presumption by
claiming special circumstances.
I searched the dockets and opinions for all chapter 7 cases in which there
was a "motion to dismiss" under § 707(b)(2), and a mention of "special cir-
cumstances." I first eliminated all cases in which the motion to dismiss was
not actually made on the basis of the presumption of abuse,3 0 or in which the
debtor's defense to the motion was that the motion was not timely."' Next,
I eliminated all cases in which the trustee moved to dismiss under
§ 707(b)(2), but the court concluded (without considering special circum-
stances) that the presumption of abuse did not apply,132 whether or not the
ments that were rejected were amendments offered by Rep. Scott that would have made the means test
inapplicable "if a substantial portion of the indebtedness was incurred as a result of illness of the debtor, a
dependent of the debtor, or the debtor's spouse if not a dependent of the debtor, id. at 475, or "if a
substantial portion of the indebtedness is due to business losses incurred by a spouse who has died or
deserted the debtor," id. at 478, or "if a substantial portion of the indebtedness was a result of unforeseen
loss of employment through no fault of the debtor," id. at 479. Also rejected was a proposed amendment
offered by Rep. Meehan which would have made the means test inapplicable to disabled veterans whose
indebtedness was incurred primarily during active duty or was the result of an injury or disability occur-
ring during active duty, id. at 482. In all cases, the amendments were rejected because the "special circum-
stances" language purportedly already covered the situations described. Id. at 476, 481, 485, 4889.
127H.R. Res. 211, 109th Cong. 1st Sess. (Apr. 14, 2005); see H.R. REP. No. 109-43, 109th Cong. 1st
Sess. (Apr. 13, 2005).
28151 CoNo. REc. H2076-77 (Apr. 14, 2005).
129Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat.
23 (2005).
'Often the court mentioned § 707(b)(2), but the trustee made a motion to dismiss for abuse based on
the totality of the circumstances under § 707(bX I) and (b)(3). See, e.g., In re Rowell, 536 B.R. 245 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 2015); In re Swanigan, No. 12-33476 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2012); In re Calhoun, 396 B.R.
270 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008), affd sub non. Calhoun v. U.S. Trustee, 650 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2011); In re
Booker, No. 08-30999 (Bankr. D. Mass. July 8, 2008); In re Felske, 385 BR. 649 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008);
In re Thurston, No. 07-35092 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2008); In re Henebury, 361 B.R. 595 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 2007); In re Mestemaker, 359 B.R 849 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007).
"'See, e.g., In re Wise, 453 BR. 220 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2011); In re Jasper, 414 B.R. 83 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2009); In re Clark, 393 BR. 578 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2008); In re Perrotta, 390 BR. 26 (Bankr. D.N.H.
2008); In re Ansar, 383 BR. 344 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2008); In re Granger, No. 07-13276 (Bankr. D.N.M.
Dec. 27, 2007); In re Reed, No. 06-10901 Dkt. 27 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007), affd sub nom. Reed v.
Anderson (In re Reed), 422 B.R. 214 (C.D. Cal. 2009); In re Close, No. 06-20195 (Bankr D. Kan. Feb. 28,
2006), affd sub nom. Turner v. Close, 384 B.R 856 (D. Kan. 2008).
1
2 See, e.g., In re Jackson, 537 B.R. 238 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2015); In re Navin, 526 B.R. 81 (Bankr. N.D.
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case was dismissed on another basis.133 Other cases were eliminated because
the trustee withdrew the motion to dismiss before the court ruled on it.' I
Ga. 2015); In re Gregory, No. 10-09739, 2011 WL 5902884 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Aug. 17, 2011), affd sub
nom. Bankruptcy Administrator v. Gregory, 471 BR. 823 (E.D.N.C. 2012); In re Babson, No. 11-00673,
2011 WL 5902664 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Nov. 1, 2011); In re Cole, 427 BR. 467 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2010); In re
Guerriero, 383 B.R. 841 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008); In re Boatright, No. 08-30442 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. May 30,
2008); In re Castillo, No. 08-10878, 2008 WL 454467 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2008); In re Ly Chang,
No. 07-50484, 2007 BL 132086 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2007); In re Megginson, No. 06-12034, 2007
WL 2609783 (Bankr. D. Md. Sept. 4, 2007); In re Hice, 376 B.R. 771 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007); In re Hayes,
376 B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007); In re Kelvie, 372 B.R. 56 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007); In re Kogler, 368
B.R 785 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2007); In re Ragle, No. 06-30208, Dkt. 30 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Mar. 23, 2007),
affd sub nom. Clippard v. Ragle, 395 B.R. 387 (E.D. Ky. 2008); In re Longo, 364 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Conn.
2006); In re Haar, 360 B.R. 759 (Bankr. D. Ohio 2007); In re Hartwick, 359 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007)
In re Wilson, 356 B.R 114 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
13'Compare In re Braathun, No. 07-00771, 2011 WL 1299605 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Apr. 4, 2011); In re
Vecera, 430 BR. 840 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2010); In re Stewart, 410 B.R. 912 (Bankr. D. Or. 2009); In re
Norwood-Hill, 403 BR. 905 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009); In re Cutler, No. 08-15568, 2009 WL 2044378
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. July 9, 2009); In re Boatright, No. 08-30442 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. May 30, 2008); In re
Vandenberg, No. 07-82291, 2008 WL 2020186 (Bankr. D. Neb. May 8, 2008); In re Richardson, No. 07-
60057, 2008 BL 357094 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Mar. 19, 2008); In re Wright, 364 BR. 640 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2007); In re Sorrel, 359 B.R. 167 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007); In re McDaniel, No. 06-62786, 2007 WL
7142479 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2007); In re Smith, No. 06-30261, 2007 WL 1836874 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio June 22, 2007); In re Gilligan, No. 06-00885, 2007 WL 6370887 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 24, 2007)
(declining to dismiss case under either § 707(b)(2) or (bX3)) with In re Johnson, 503 B.R. 447 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 2013); In re Holmes, No. 12-01801 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2012); In re Kreiling, No. 09-21000,
2010 WL 1707501 (Bankr. D. Wyo. Apr. 26, 2010); In re Brady, 419 BR. 479 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009); In
ye Phillips, 417 B.R. 30 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2009); In re Perelman, 419 B.R. 168 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009); In
re Goble, 401 B.R. 261 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2009); In re Altman, No. 09-70328, 2009 BL 343412 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 2009); In re Davis, No. 09-32507, 2008 WL 4279547 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 12,
2008); In re Parada, 391 BR. 492 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008); In re Augenstein, No. 06-13867, 2007 WL
6374910 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 14, 2007); In re Davis, 378 B.R. 539 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007); In re
Walker, No. 05-15010 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 26, 2005) (declining to dismiss case under § 707(b)(2) but
dismissing case under § 707(b)(3)); cf. Masur v. Fokkena, No. 07-04167, 2009 WL 3150891 (D.S.D. Sept.
30, 2009); In re Vanhoose, No. 06-31813, 2007 WL 6383334 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 21, 2007); In re
Billie, 367 BR. 586 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007); In re Zaporski, 366 B.R. 758 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007); In re
Nockerts, 357 BR. 497 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Wilson, 356 B.R. 114 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (declin-
ing to dismiss under § 707(bX2) and ordering another hearing to determine whether case should be dis-
missed under § 707(bX3)). Cf. also In re Jaramillo, No. 13-11090 (Bankr. D.N.M. Mar. 31, 2013)
(declining to consider § 707(bX2) because court dismissed case under § 707(b)(3).
's4See, e.g., In re Harlin, No. 15-51635 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 4, 2015); In re Purse, No. 13-43784
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2013); In re Chandler, No. 13-53964 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 19, 2013); In re
Plotchev, No. 13-45030 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2013); In re Vandermaas, No. 08-28854 (Bankr. D.
Colo. Nov. 25, 2008); In re Green, No. 08-14721 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Nov. 24, 2008); In re Stelljes, No. 08-
09166 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 23, 2008); In re Sundin, No. 09-54526 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 7, 2008); In re
Pareja, No. 08-12217 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2008); In re Hill, No. 08-50941 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Feb. 5,
2008); In re Perkins, No. 08-01222 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2008); In re Almaro, No. 07-19631 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2007); In re Hobbs, No. 07-03099 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Sept. 23, 2007); In re Crockett,
No. 07-22566 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Sept. 21, 2007); In re Fryson, No. 07-40369 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. July 13,
2007); In re Mendez, No. 07-11092 (Bankr. D.N.M. May 8, 2007); In re Gay, No. 06-08570 (Bankr. S.D.
Ind. Dec. 29, 2006); In re Diaz, No. 06-19371 (Bankr. D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2006); In re Brown, No. 06-33253
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 10, 2006); In re Bullington, No. 06-11303 (Bankr. W.D Tex. Aug. 29, 2006). Cf.
In re Molitor, No. 07-11472 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2007) (court ruled that motion was timely filed, and
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have, however, included one case in which the bankruptcy court ruled in
favor of dismissal, the debtor appealed, but the trustee then agreed to with-
draw the motion and the district court vacated the bankruptcy court order of
dismissal.135 I also eliminated cases in which the debtor voluntarily dismissed
the case or converted the case to chapter 13 or chapter 11 after the filing of
the motion, so there was no ruling on the substance of the motion. 13 6
It was striking that in a large number of the cases in which the trustee
made a motion to dismiss based on the presumption of abuse, the debtor did
not claim "special circumstances" to rebut the presumption.137 I also ex-
trustee withdrew it after receiving debtor's statement of special circumstances); In re Cadwallder, No. 06-
36424 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2006) (court ruled that the motion was timely filed, and trustee then
withdrew it); In re Thomas, No. 06-21108 (Bankr. D. Kan. July 27, 2006) (bankruptcy court denied motion
to dismiss, district court reversed sub nom. Wieland v. Thomas, 382 BR. 793 (D. Kan. 2008), and motion
was then withdrawn).
"'sIn re Pampas, No. 06-10936 (Bankr. M.D. La. Oct. 27, 2006).
"'See, e.g., In re Sookhram, No. 15-15228 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2015); In re Cook, No. 15-
40373 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Jan. 13, 2015); In re Patrick, No. 14-11203 (Bankr. W.D. La. May 28, 2014); In
re Ruffino, No. 14-30460 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2014); In re Tuel, No. 13-52180 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Mar.
14, 2012); In re Popalzai, No. 10-12664 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2010); In re Gillespie, No. 08-10279
(Bankr. DR.I. Jan. 31, 2008); In re Barrett, No. 07-01496 (Bankr. W.D Mich. Mar. 2, 2007). See also In re
Szymanski, No. 08-04806 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2007) (debtor converted to chapter 13 after motion
filed, reconverted to chapter 7 three months later, and motion to dismiss was withdrawn).
117In these cases, the U.S. trustee was generally challenging whether certain expenses or income
amounts claimed by the debtor were appropriate. However, two debtors challenged § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) as
unconstitutionally delegating legislative power to the Internal Revenue Service. See In re Williams, No.
11-61683, 2012 WL 930245 (Bankr. D. Or. Mar. 19, 2012); In re Wedblad, No. 10-65055, 2012 WL
245967 (Bankr. D. Or. Jan. 26, 2012). In some cases, the issue was not the computation of the means test,
but whether the debtors were individuals with debts that were primarily consumer debts to whom the
means test applied. See, e.g., Modi v. Virani (In Te Virani), No. 15-61378, 2015 WL 6145508 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. Oct. 15, 2015); In re Davis, No. 12-11122, 2015 WL 260708 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2015); In re
Fish, No. 13-05783, 2014 WL 657247 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Feb. 20, 2014); In re De Cunae, No. 12-37424,
2013 WL 6389205 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2013); In re Grover, No. 12-01069, 2013 WL 3994608
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa Aug. 2, 2013); In re Terzo, 502 BR. 553 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013); In re St. Jean, 515 B.R.
864 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); In re Victoria, No. 10-42087, 2011 WL 2580106 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. June 22,
2011); In re Rucker, 454 B.R. 554 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2011); In re Beasley, No. 08-14081 (Bankr. W.D
Wash. June 30, 2008).
Many cases involve whether the debtor may deduct payments on secured debts if the debtor intends
to surrender the collateral. See, e.g., In re Powers, 534 B.R. 207 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2015); In re Navin, 526
BR. 81 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2015); In re Hamilton, 513 BR. 292 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2014); In 7e White, 512
B.R. 822 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2014); In re Johnson, 503 B.R. 447 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2013); In re Holmes, No.
12-01801 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2012); In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012); In re
Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. 131 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012); In re Ng, No. 10-02001 (Bankr. D. Hawaii Nov. 28,
2011); In re Grinkmeyer, 456 B.R. 385 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2011); In re Vecera, 430 B.R. 840 (Bankr. S.D. Ind.
2010); McDow v. Harvey (In re Harvey), 407 B.R. 867 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2009); In re Altman, No. 09-
70328, 2009 WL 5200522 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 2009); Masur v. Fokkena, No. 07-04167, 2009 WL
3150891 (D.S.D. Sept. 30, 2009); In ie Phillips, 417 B.R. 30 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2009); In re Cutler, No. 08-
15568, 2009 WL 2044378 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. July 9, 2009); In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. 905 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2009); In re Parada, 391 B.R. 492 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008); In re Guerriero, 383 B.R. 841 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2008); In re Stelljes, No. 08-09166 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 23, 2008); In re Vandenberg, No. 07-82291,
2008 WL 2020186 (Bankr. D. Neb. May 8, 2008); In re Louis, No. 07-13019, 2008 WL 1777461 (Bankr.
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E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2008); In re Richardson, No. 07-60057, 2008 BL 357094 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Mar. 19,
2008); In re Ly Chang, No. 07-50484, 2007 BL 3034679 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2007); In re Smale, No.
07-11396 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 27, 2007); In re McDaniel, No. 06-62786, 2007 WL 7142479 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. Aug. 24, 2007); In re Hayes, 376 BR. 55 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007); In re Kelvie, 372 B.R. 56 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 2007); In re Augenstein, No. 06-13867, 2007 WL 6374910 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 14, 2007); In re
Wright, 364 B.R. 640 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007); In ye Maya, No. 07-01561 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Mar. 30,
2007); In re Vanhoose, No. 06-31813, 2007 WL 6383334 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 21, 2007); In re Kogler,
368 B.R 785 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2007); In re Wilkins, No. 07-11180 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007); In re
Leary, No. 07-31370 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2007); In re Ray, 362 B.R. 680 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007); In re
Haar, 360 B.R. 759 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2007); In re Sorrell, 359 B.R. 167 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007);
In re Hartwick, 359 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007); In re Melin, No. 06-32652 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 27,
2006); In re Nockerts, 357 B.R. 497 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Mundy, No. 06-00875 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
May 5, 2006); In re Rudler, No. 06-10982 (Bankr. D.N.H. Aug. 15, 2006), affd sub nom. Morse v. Rudler,
576 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2009); In re Walker, No. 05-15010 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 26, 2005). Cf In re Byers,
501 B.R. 82 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2013) (debtor could not deduct payments on mortgage he did not intend to
pay); In re Brandenburg, No. 07-20244, 2007 WL 1459402 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May 15, 2007) (holding
debtor could not deduct payments on debt secured by real property surrendered before bankruptcy filing).
Another issue was whether unemployment payments should be excluded from the computation of
"current monthly income." See, e.g., In re Bryant, No. 08-32261 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Oct. 21, 2008); In re
Sorrell, 359 B.R. 167 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007); In re Munger, 370 B.R 21 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007).
Other cases, predating the Supreme Court's decision in Ransom v. FIA Card Services, NA., 562 U.S.
61 (2011), dealt with the issue of whether the debtor could deduct transportation ownership expenses for
vehicles on which the debtor had no lease or loan payments. See, e.g., In re Kafi, 413 B.R. 544 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. 2009); In re Koch, 408 B.R. 539 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009); Masur v. Fokkena, No. 07-04167, 2009 WL
3150891 (D.S.D. Sept. 30, 2009); In re Meade, 384 BR. 132 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2008); In re Brown, 376
B.R. 601 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007); In re Hice, 376 B.R. 771 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007); In re Megginson, No. 06-
12034, 2007 WL 2609783 (Bankr. D. Md. Sept. 4, 2007); In re McDaniel, No. 06-62786, 2007 WL
7142479 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2007); In ye Smith, No. 06-30261, 2007 WL 1836874 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio June 22, 2007); In re Billie, 367 B.R. 586 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007); In re Leary, No. 07-31370 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2007); In re Tate, No. 07-50028 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Jan. 10, 2007); In re Thomas, No. 06-
21108 (Bankr. D. Kan. July 27, 2006), rev'd sub nom. Wieland v. Thomas, 382 B.R. 793 (D. Kan. 2008); In
re Garcia, No. 07-00268, 2007 WL 2692232 (Bankr. D. Ari. Sept. 11, 2007); In re Wilson, 356 B.R. 114
(Bankr. D. Del. 2006); In re Ross-Tousey, No. 06-24573 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Aug. 18, 2006), rev'd sub nom.
Neary v. Ross-Tousey, 368 B.R. 762 (E.D. Wis. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Ross-Tousey v. Neary, 549 F.3d
1148 (7th Cir. 2008); In re Deadmond, No. 06-60512, 2008 WL 346111 (Bankr. D. Mon. June 29, 2006);
In re Talmadge, No. 06-50001 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 3. 2006); In re Harris, 353 B.R 304 (Bankr. E.D Okla.
2006); In re Skaggs, 349 B.R. 594 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2006).
Still others deal with the treatment of payments on loans from or contributions to retirement (401(k))
accounts. See, e.g., In re Lancaster, No. 09-12269 (Bankr. D.N.M. Feb. 3, 2011); In re Brace, 430 B.R. 513
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010); In re Harrison, No. 09-51072, 2010 WL 398975 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Jan. 25, 2010);
In re Koch, 408 B.R. 539 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009); Masur v. Fokkena, No. 07-04167, 2009 WL 3150891
(D.S.D. Sept. 30, 2009); In ye Lewis, No. 07-32371, 2007 WL 2742854 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2007);
In re Whitaker, No. 06-33109, 2007 WL 2156397 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 25, 2007); cf. In re Otero, No.
06-30691, Dkt. 22-1 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2006), rev'd sub nom. McVay v. Otero, 371 B.R. 190
(W.D. Tex. 2007); In re Melin, No. 06-32652 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2006).
In one case, the trustee argued that the IRS expense standards were not applicable to a debtor whose
actual expenses in the relevant category were less. See In reJackson, 537 B.R. 238 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2015).
In other cases the trustee disputed particular items of the debtors' claimed income or expenses. See,
e.g., In re Cayanan, No. 07-42354 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 27, 2007). See, e.g., In re Kruse, 545 B.R. 581
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2016); In re Burgher, 539 B.R. 868 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2015); In re Montalto, 537 B.R.
147 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015); In re Molina, No. 14-21469, 2014 WL 1243664 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Mar. 12,
2015); In re Wenzel, No. 14-32432, 2015 WL 1087409 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2015); In re Terzo, 502
B.R. 553 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013); In re Clary, No. 11-04556, 2012 WL 8687171 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 14,
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cluded those cases, unless the court expressly considered whether the debtor
should be deemed to have established special circumstances despite the
debtor's failure to mention those words in any filed document. Conversely,
in some cases the debtor filed a response to the motion to dismiss that seemed
to claim special circumstances, but the court's ruling on the motion did not
address the debtor's attempt to rebut the presumption.13 8 I have also ex-
cluded these cases.
Although I limited my search to chapter 7 cases, the search turned up a
large number of cases originally filed under chapter 13 and later converted to
chapter 7. I did not include these cases because the debtor was seeking to
modify his or her calculation of projected disposable income for purposes of
the chapter 13 plan'39 by claiming that "special circumstances" warranted the
2012); In re Hammer, No. 11-12287, 2012 WL 162303 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. Jan. 19, 2012); In re Sturm, 483
B.R. 312 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2012); In re Rable, 445 B.R. 826 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2011); In re Lancaster, No.
09-12269, 2011 BL 28320 (Bankr. D.N.M. Feb. 3, 2011); In re St. Jean, 515 B.R. 864 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2011); In re Auger, No. 10-31450, 2011 BL 391268 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2011); In re Urban, 432 B.R.
302 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 2009); McDow v. Williams (In re Williams), 424 B.R. 27 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2010); In
re Okorowski, No. 09-36108, 2010 BL 376391 (Bankr N.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2010); In re Gray, No. 09-10120,
2009 WL 3486658 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Oct. 21, 2009); In re Woodruff, 416 B.R. 369 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2009); In re Justice, 404 B.R. 506 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2009); In re Burks, No. 08-20346, 2009 WL 103618
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2009); In re Marsh, No. 07-35576, 2008 WL 3200255 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug.
5, 2008); In re Jones, No. 08-90194, 2008 WL 2676841 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. July 3, 2008); In re Boehlke, No.
07-26788, 2008 WL 276499 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Jan. 30, 2008); In re Burden, 380 B.R. 194 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 2007); In re Hale, No. 07-32744, 2007 WL 2990760 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2007); In re Blausey,
No. 06-10826 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 3, 2007), affd sub nom. Blausey v. U.S. Trustee, 552 F.3d 1124 (9th
Cir. 2009); In re Munger, No. 07-40439 (Bankr. D. Mass. Feb. 6, 2007).
In one case, the debtors originally claimed 'special circumstances" but explicitly abandoned that argu-
ment. See In re Nabulsi, No. 11-65698, 2013 WL 3784188, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 16, 2013). I
have not included that case. In another, debtors claimed special circumstances when they originally filed
under chapter 13, but after they converted the case to chapter 7, did not attempt to rebut the presump-
tion when the trustee filed a motion to dismiss for abuse. See In re Seymour, No. 07-09005 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. Sept. 28, 2007).
"sSee In re Meyer, 467 B.R. 451 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2012); In re Leary, No. 07-31370 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
Mar. 1, 2007); In re Martinez, 391 B.R. 424 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008); In re Meade, 384 B.R. 132 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 2008); In re Ragle, No. 06-30208, Dkt. 30 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Mar. 23, 2007), affd sub nom.
Clippard v. Ragle, 395 B.R. 387 (E.D. Ky. 2008). Cf. In re Otero, No. 06-30691, Dkt. 22-1 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. Nov. 2, 2006), rev'd sub nom. McVay v. Otero, 371 B.R. 190 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (debtor claimed that
son's medical condition and anticipated medical expenses were special circumstances, but the court ruled
that repayment of 401(k) loan was special circumstances, a ruling that was reversed by the district court).
' 9Under § 1325(b)(1), if the trustee or an unsecured creditor objects to confirmation of a chapter 13
plan, the plan cannot be confirmed unless the plan either pays unsecured creditors in full or provides that
-all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period ... will
be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
The term "disposable income" is defined to mean "current monthly income," see note 14 supra, with
certain exclusions, less (among other things) amounts "reasonably necessary to be expended," 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b)(2), for maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b)(2)(A)(i). Congress directed that amounts "reasonably necessary to be expended," must be "de-
termined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 707(b)(2)," 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3), if
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the debtor is an above-median debtor. An above-median debtor is one that satisfies the provisions of
§ 1325(b)(3), which means that the debtor has:
current monthly income, when multiplied by 12, greater than -
(A) in the case of a debtor in a household of 1 person, the median family income
of the applicable State for 1 earner;
(B) in the case of a debtor in a household of 2, 3 or 4 individuals, the highest
median family income for the applicable State for a family of the same number or
fewer individuals; or
(C) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals, the highest
mean family income for the applicable State for a family of 4 or fewer individu-
als, plus $625 per month for each individual in excess of 4.
Id. (The $625 figure in clause (C) is subject to adjustment for changes in the cost of living every three
years pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 104(a), and was adjusted effective April 1, 2016 to $700.)
Section 707(b)(2)(A) is the provision creating the presumption of abuse, which is, of course, rebuttable
by a showing of "special circumstances" under § 707(b)(2)(B). Therefore, in determining whether an
above-median chapter 13 debtor has correctly computed his or her projected disposable income, courts
have allowed the debtor to submit evidence that there are "special circumstances" justifying modifications
to the calculation of projected disposable income mandated by § 707(b)(2)(A). See, e.g., In re Zahringer,
No. 07-30217, 2008 WL 2245864, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May 30, 2008); In re Crego, 387 B.R. 225, 228
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008); In re Sadler, 378 B.R. 780, 786 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007); In re Knight, 370 B.R.
429, 435-36 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007); In re Crabtree, No. 07-60543, 2007 WL 3024030, at *5 (Bankr. D.
Mont. Oct. 12, 2007); In re Sparks, 360 B.R 224, 229 (Bankr E.D Tex. 2006); In re Tranmer, 355 B.R 234
(Bankr. D. Mon. 2006). But see In re Clemons, 404 B.R. 577, 582 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006) (holding "special
circumstances" not applicable to chapter 13 case).
Many of the chapter 13 cases dealing with "special circumstances" predate the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505 (2010), in which the Court held that "when a bankruptcy court
calculates a debtor's projected disposable income [pursuant to Section 1325(b)(1)], the court may account
for changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirma-
tion." Id. at 524. Prior to Lanning, some courts were attempting to deal with differences between the
debtor's actual historic income used in computing "disposable income" and the income debtor anticipated
receiving in the future by utilizing the "special circumstances" doctrine. See, e.g., In re Pak, 378 B.R. 257,
272 (9th Cir. BAP 2007); In re DeThample, 390 B.R. 716, 725 n.49 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008); In re Parulan,
387 B.R. 168, 173 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008); In re Schley, No. 08-26146, 2008 WL 3895562, at *2 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. Aug. 22, 2008); In re Jones, No. 07-81646, 2007 WL 4893472 (Bankr. D. Neb. Dec. 14, 2007);
In re Moore, 367 B.R. 721, 727 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007); In re Hanks, 362 B.R. 494, 501-02 (Bankr. D. Utah
2007); In re Jass, 340 B.R. 411, 418-19 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006). But see In re Wilson, 397 B.R. 299, 314-15
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2008); In re Briscoe, 374 B.R. 1, 17 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007) (holding that "special circum-
stances" doctrine is applicable only to expenses, not income). Because of the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of "projected disposable income," use of the "special circumstances" doctrine in chapter 13 cases is no
longer necessary to reflect anticipated changed in the debtor's income.
Although Lanning involved a change in the debtor's anticipated income, arguably the language of
Lanning (which referred to "changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are known or virtually certain
at the time of confirmation"), 560 U.S. at 524, also suggested that the above-median debtor need not
invoke special circumstances to modify the expenses allowed by the computation of allowable expenses
under §§ 1325(bX2) and 707(b)(2)(A) and (B) as long as the modified amounts are "known or virtually
certain." See, e.g., In re Wiley, No. 10-19988, 2011 WL 10656548, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011)
(directing debtors to amend plan consistent with Lanning to reflect ways in which their "personal and
financial condition may have changed in a way that makes the allowance or disallowance of certain ex-
penses more appropriate or irrelevant."). Cf. In re Mansfield, No. 11-28949, 2012 WL 877105, at *4
(Bankr. D. Colo. Mar. 15, 2012) (finding it uncertain whether special circumstances doctrine is applicable
at all in chapter 13 after Lanning). Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts since Lanning have consistently
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exclusion of certain income or the inclusion of additional expenses.'40 None
involved an attempt to rebut the presumption of abuse in the chapter 7 after
conversion.141
After eliminating all these cases and other cases that did not satisfy my
criteria, I found 129 cases in which: (1) the trustee made a motion to dismiss
utilized the special circumstances doctrine in analyzing whether expenses in excess of those allowed by the
provisions of § 707(b)(2) may be reflected in computing projected disposable income.
Courts in chapter 13 cases appear to be somewhat more generous in interpreting "special circum-
stances" than those considering motions to dismiss in chapter 7. See, eg., In re Brown, 500 B.R. 255, 269
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2013) (private school tuition for child with auditory and speech disorders was special
circumstance); In re Barbutes, 436 BR. 518 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010) (finding the fact that debtors lived
in twenty-year-old house in need of repair was a special circumstance justifying additional home mainte-
nance expenses, fact that debtor was fifty-two years old and had a limited period of future employment
constituted special circumstances for allowing Roth IRA contributions); In re Daniel-Sanders, 420 B.R 102
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2009) (expenses of second car needed for father's use constituted special circumstances);
In re Stubbs, No. 07-61165, 2007 WL 4287579 (Bankr. D. Mont. Dec. 6, 2007) (inability to find housing
at lesser cost constituted special circumstances); In re Knight, 370 B.R. 429, 438 (Bankr N.D. Ga. 2007)
(student loan payments constitute special circumstances). But see In re Brown, 500 B.R. 255 (Bankr. S.D.
Ga. 2013) (nondischargeable student loans do not constitute special circumstances for including payment
amounts in computing projected disposable income); In re Johnson, 446 B.R. 921 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2011)
(same); In re Martellaro, 404 B.R 548 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2008) (same); In re Zahringer, No. 07-30217, 2008
WL 2245864 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May 30, 2008) (same); In re Knight, 370 B.R. 429 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007)
(same); cf. In re Harris, 522 B.R. 804, 819 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2014) (suggesting that special circumstances
for a higher house expense or car expense might be shown if "debtor could demonstrate the need for a
larger house or that the car only has one more payment and is in a state of disrepair"). This is not
surprising. If a debtor fails to demonstrate special circumstances in a chapter 7 case, the result is that the
debtor is forced to file a chapter 13 or a chapter 11 case. If a debtor fails to demonstrate special circum-
stances in a chapter 13 case, the result may be that the debtor cannot get a chapter 13 plan confirmed, and
therefore may be denied the benefit of bankruptcy entirely.
"It should also be noted that some bankruptcy courts consider whether there are "special circum-
stances" in connection with their analysis of whether a chapter 13 debtor has proposed its plan in good
faith, as required by § 1325(a)(3). These courts apply a multi-factor approach, including "the existence of
special circumstances such as inordinate medical expenses." See, eg., Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell),
895 F.2d 1123, 1126-327 (6th Cir. 1990); Smyrnos v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 213 B.R. 349, 352-53 (9th Cit.
BAP 1997); In re Lofty, 437 B.R. 578, 586 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010); In re McDonald, 437 B.R. 278, 285
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010); In re Stitt, 403 B.R. 694, 700 (Bankr D. Idaho 2008). This is, of course, a
different concept than that embodied in § 707(b)(2)(B).
1
4 1Courts disagree about whether the means test applies to a case filed under another chapter and
converted to chapter 7. Compare Fokkena v. Chapman (In re Chapman), 447 B.R. 250 (8th Cit. BAP
2011); In re Kruse, 545 B.R. 581 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2016); In re Burgher, 539 B.R. 868 (Bankr. D. Colo.
2015); In re Summerville, 515 B.R. 651 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014); In re Lassiter, 2011 WL 2039363, 2011
Bankr.LEXIS 1927 (Bankr. E.D. Va- May 24, 2011); In re Willis, 408 B.R. 803 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009); In
re Kellett, 379 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007); In re Reece, 498 B.R. 72 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2013); In re St.
Jean, 515 B.R. 864 (Bankr. M.D. Fla- 2011); In re Perfetto, 361 B.R. 27 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2007) (means test
applicable) with In re Thoemke, 2014 Bankr.LEXIS 451 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014); In re Layton, 480 B.R.
392 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012); In re Pate, 2012 WL 6737814, 2012 Bankr.LEXIS 5926 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
Dec. 28, 2012); McDow v. Dudley (In re Dudley), 405 B.R. 790 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2009); In re Miller, 381
B.R. 736 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2008); In re Fox, 370 B.R. 639 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (means test applies only
to cases filed under chapter 7, not those converted to chapter 7). See generally Kathleen Murphy & Justin
H. Dion, "Means Test" or "Just a Mean Test": An Examination of the Requirement that Converted Chapter
7 Bankruptcy Debtors Comply with Amended Section 707(b), 16 ABI L. REV. 413 (2008).
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on the basis of the presumption of abuse, (2) the debtor then made some
attempt to rebut the presumption under § 707(b)(2)(B) by claiming "special
circumstances" or, if not, the court treated the motion as if the debtor had
done so, and (3) the court resolved the motion under § 707(b)(2) and sub-
stantively addressed the issue of "special circumstances."142 As demonstrated
14 2The cases that met these criteria were the following (the dates listed are their filing dates): In re
Fudge, No. 15-51518 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2016); In re Mathews, Nol. 15-31680 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
Oct. 20, 2015); In re Haskins, No. 15-40736 (Bankr. D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2015); In re Ervin, No. 15-70467
(Bankr. W.D. Va. Apr. 7, 2015); In re Alther, No. 14-62429 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Dec. 19, 2014); In re
Chabre, No. 14-4981 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2014); In re Wilson, No. 14-30234 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Jan.
31, 2014); In re Tedford, No. 14-00008 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Jan. 2, 2014); In re Hurst, No. 13-05987 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. Sept. 23, 2013); In re Mittelstaedt, No. 13-50225 (Bankr. D.S.D. Aug. 2, 2013); In re Martin, No.
13-01872 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa June 28, 2013) (Patrick Martin); In re Strickland, No. 13-42820 (Bankr. D.
Minn. May 31, 2013); In re Bradley, No. 13-01390 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2013); In re Hartley, No. 13-
61182 (Bankr. D. Or. Apr. 4, 2013); In re Kowal, No. 12-82897 (Bankr. D. Neb. Dec. 28, 2012); In re
Taborski, No. 12-23966 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2012); In re Thomas, No. 12-12205 (Bankr. D. Del. July
27, 2012); In re Robinson, No. 12-02313 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. July 18, 2012); In re Barker, No. 12-32954
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 25, 2012); In re Grover, No. 12-01069, 2013 WL 3994608 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
Aug. 2, 2013); In re Persaud, No. 12-43602 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. May 17, 2012); In re Copeland, No. 12-
32287 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 14, 2012); In re Burdett, No. 12-12066 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2012); In
re Edwards, No. 12-00603 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 2012) (Marcus Edwards); In re Moose, No. 11-51816
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2011); In re Weinert, No. 11-69840 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 18, 2011); In re
Mansfield, No. 11-06867 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Sept. 8, 2011); In re Howell, No. 11-12685 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 2, 2011); In re Grenardo, No. 11-25401 (Bankr. D. Colo. June 28, 2011); In re Campbell, No. 11-
51573 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. May 31, 2011); In re Thompson, No. 11-01403 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2011)
(Michael Thompson); In re Inghilterra, No. 11-11776 (Bankr. D. Colo. Jan. 31, 2011); In re DeJoy, No. 11-
10268 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y Jan. 3, 2011); In re Greer, No. 10-63833 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010); In re
Fechter, No. 10-62688 (Bankr. D. Mont. Nov. 16, 2010); In re Hodson, No. 10-62666 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
Oct. 30, 2010); In re Enriquez, No. 10-62662 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2010); In re Lunn, No. 10-62282
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010); In re Sanders, No. 10-11939 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 2010); In re
Katz, No. 10-50721 (Bankr C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2010); In re Wise, No. 10-32441 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Sept. 22,
2010); In re Maura, No. 10-68295 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2010); In re Ross, No. 10-81200 (Bankr.
M.D. Ala. Aug. 3, 2010); In re Harmon, No. 10-15329 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. June 30, 2010); In re Leggett, No.
10-03383 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Apr. 28, 2010); In re Burggraf, No. 10-32297 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2010);
In re Anderson, No. 10-11161 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010); In re Conlee, No. 10-31243 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio Mar. 4, 2010); In re Chambers, No. 10-00856 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Mar. 1, 2010); In re Polkinghorn,
No. 10-31093 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2010); In re Rudnick, No. 10-30484 (Bankr. D. Minn. Jan. 26,
2010); In re Smith, No. 10-30243 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Jan. 19, 2010) (Steven Smith); In re Hammock, No.
09-11485 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Dec. 31, 2009); In re Miller, No. 09-07528 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Dec. 31, 2009); In
re Meyers, No. 09-77897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 11, 2009); In re Stanley, No. 09-09265 (Bankr. D.S.C.
Dec. 10, 2009); In re Roach, No. 09-76184 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2009); In re Siler, No. 09-33227
(Bankr. W.D.N.C. Nov. 20, 2009); In re Edwards, No. 09-09250 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 23, 2009) (Judith
Edwards); In re Robrock, No. 09-36740 (Bankr. D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2009); In re Linville, No. 09-14121
(Bankr. D.N.M. Sept. 11, 2009); In re Rieck, No. 09-35677 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 14, 2009); In re Carrillo,
No. 09-13658 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 17, 2009); In re Cotto, No. 09-43772 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2009);
In re Taylor, No. 09-32681 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Apr. 24, 2009); In re Willson, No. 09-02811 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa. Apr. 14, 2009); In re Womer, No. 08-04779 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2008); In re Murzyn, No. 08-
15279 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Oct. 29, 2008); In re Applegate, No. 08-15936 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2008); In
re Mravik, No. 08-28754 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Aug. 12, 2008); In re Hunt, No. 08-06916 (Bankr. S.D. Ind.
June 12, 2008); In re Meade, No. 08-70942 (Bankr. W.D. Va. May 23, 2008); In re Fonash, No. 08-01856
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. May 22, 2008); In re Willis, No. 08-41820 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. May 9, 2008); In re
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below, although some courts entertain many more such motions than others,
bankruptcy judges uniformly are reluctant to conclude that special circum-
stances overcome the presumption of abuse in a chapter 7 case.
1. Courts in Which Debtors Attempt to Overcome Presumption of
Abuse
Because the rate of chapter 7 filings for consumer debtors is higher in
certain parts of the country than in others, one might expect that more mo-
tions to dismiss based on the presumption of abuse - and more efforts by
debtors to overcome that presumption - would be made in those jurisdictions
than in areas where most consumer bankruptcies are filed under chapter 13
initially. The data does not support this assumption.
Hernandez, No. 08-31588 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Apr. 3, 2008); In re Smith, No. 08-31131 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
June 2, 2008) (Carrie Smith); In re Samson, No. 08-80615 (Bankr. D. Neb. Mar. 11, 2008); In re Tauter,
No. 08-1106 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 29, 2008); In re Showers, No. 08-30359 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Jan. 29,
2008); In re Graham, No. 06-54764 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Dec. 13, 2007); In re Rold, No. 07-14259 (Bankr.
S.D. Iowa Dec. 12, 2007); In re Pignotti, No. 07-04109 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Nov. 30, 2007); In re Wagner,
No. 07-42262 (Bankr. D. Neb. Nov. 29, 2007); In re Watkins, No. 07-6317 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Nov. 27,
2007); In re Darling, No. 07-10746 (Bankr. D. Vt. Nov. 6, 2007); In re Budig, No. 07-02042 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa Nov. 6, 2007); In re Smith, No. 07-82462 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2007) (Earl Smith); In re Stocker,
No. 07-05100 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2007); In re Patterson, No. 07-17224 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept. 4,
2007); In re Cribbs, No. 07-41342 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2007); In re Jackson, No. 07-21717 (Bankr. D.
Kan. Aug, 8, 2007); In re Mowris, No. 07-61100 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. July 31, 2007); In re Pageau, No. 07-
11366 (Bankr. D.N.H. June 29, 2007); In re Shinkle, No. 07-20852 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. June 11, 2007); In re
Witek, No. 07-32236 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 25, 2007); In re Vaccariello, No. 07-41034 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio May 4, 2007); In re Champagne, No. 07-10913 (Bankr. D. Kan. Apr. 24, 2007); In re Goodall, No. 07-
30219 (Bankr. D.N.D. Mar. 23, 2007); In re Ryder, No. 07-40538 (Bankr. D. Neb. Mar. 20, 2007); In re
Naut, No. 07-20280 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2007); In re Binninger, No. 07-11203 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Feb.
16, 2007); In re Herbert, No. 07-40224 (Bankr. D. Neb. Feb. 5, 2007); In re Littman, No. 07-20034 (Bankr.
D. Idaho Feb. 5, 2007); In re Tamez, No. 07-60047 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2007); In re Egebjerg, No.
06-12592 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2006), affd sub nom. Egebjerg v. Anderson, 574 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir.
2009); In re Ferando, No. 06-81855 (Bankr. D. Neb. Nov. 15, 2006); In re Starkey, No. 06-81473 (Bankr.
D. Neb. Sept. 26, 2006); In re Heath, No. 06-51407 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 2006); In re Haman, No.
06-10857 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 15, 2006); In re Pampas, No. 06-10936 (Bankr. M.D. La. Oct. 27, 2006); In
re Martin, No. 06-71461 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2006) (Chad Martin); In re Delbecq, No. 06-04785
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. Aug. 18, 2006); In re Delunas, No. 06-43133 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. July 19, 2006); In re
Templeton, No. 06-11567 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. July 7, 2006); In re Lightsey, No. 06-40896 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
July 5, 2006); In re Armstrong, No. 06-31414 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 13, 2006); In re Batzkiel, No. 06-
00355 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Apr. 21, 2006); In re Scarafiotti, No. 06-11402 (Bankr. D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2006);
In re Castle, No. 06-30266 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2006); In re Lenton, No. 06-10520 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
Dec. 15, 2006); In re Melin, No. 06-32652 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2006); In re Turner, No. 06-10877
(Bankr. D.N.H. July 27, 2006); In re Mordis, No. 06-42590 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. June 15, 2006); In re Robi-
nette, No. 06-10585 (Bankr. D.N.M. Apr. 17, 2006); In re Oliver, No. 06-10134 (Bankr. Feb. 6, 2006); In
re Singletary, No. 06-30339 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2006); In re Barraza, No. 06-40220 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
Jan. 31, 2006); In re Thompson, No. 06-10024 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Jan. 5, 2006) (Gregory Thompson); In re
Johns, No. 05-87034 (Bankr. E.D Okla. Dec. 9, 2005).
In one case the court concluded that the presumption of abuse was satisfied, but deferred consideration
of special circumstances to a subsequent hearing, and the debtor voluntarily converted the case to one
under chapter 13 before the court could rule on whether special circumstances existed. See In re Bohnen-
blusch, No. 10-79097, 2011 WL 1102809 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2011). I have not included that case.
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The following chart shows the percentage (rounded to the nearest whole
number) of total nonbusiness filings in each circuit made under chapter 7
during the 3-month period ending March 31, 2016, the last period for which
statistics are available:143
% Nonbusiness filings under chapter 7 for 3 mos. ending 3/31/2016
D.C. 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th
84 60 76 64 56 39 66 64 69 75 73 50
Compare these figures to the number of the cases in the sample for each
circuit:
D.C. 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th
0 3144 6145 9146 117147 6148 124 4917150 231s1 13152 9153 12154
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits have the highest number of cases in which the
trustee has brought a motion to dismiss based on the presumption of abuse
and in which the debtor attempted to rebut. Neither has a very high (or very
low) rate of chapter 7 filings compared to the other circuits. The Eleventh
Circuit, with the lowest percentage of chapter 7 filings, has double the num-
ber of motions to dismiss in which special circumstances are considered than
the Second Circuit, with the highest percentage of nonbusiness chapter 7
cases (other than the D.C. Circuit where the numbers are very small).
Within those circuits, the bankruptcy courts in the Northern District of
143These percentages were derived from Table F-2, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts - Business and Nonbusi-
ness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the Three-Month Period Ending





'4 5Anderson; Cotto; Darling; Dejoy; Howell; Persaud.
'
4 6
Fonash; Haman; Harmon; Lenton; Naut; Taborski; Thomas; Willson; Womer.
'
4 7
Alther; Burdett; Judith Edwards; Ervin; Hammock; Hurst; Leggett; Mansfield; Meade; Moose; Mittel-
staedt; Mordis; Mowris; Showers; Siler; Carrie Smith; Stanley.
148Barraza; Oliver; Pampas; Robinson; Singletary; Tamez.
'
4 9
Armstrong; Barker; Burggraf; Campbell; Castle; Conlee; Copeland; Fudge; Graham; Heath; Her-
nandez; Maura; Melin; Meyers; Polkinghorn; Roach; Shinkle; Steven Smith; Taylor; Gregory Thompson;
Vaccariello; Weinert; Wilson; Witek.
'oDelbecq; Hunt; Chad Martin; Mathews; Mravik; Earl Smith; Wise.
'
5
Binninger; Batzkiel; Budig; Chambers; Delunas; Ferando; Coodall; Grover; Herbert; Kowal; Patrick




Applegate; Carrillo; Egebjerg; Enriquez; Fechter, Creer; Hartley, Hodson; Katz; Littman; Lunn;
Murzyn; Watkins.
'"Champagne; Grenardo; Inghilterra; Jackson; Johns; Linville; Robinette; Scarafiotti; Templeton.
'14Bradley; Chabre; Cribbs; Marcus Edwards; Lightsey; Miller, Patterson; Ross; Sanders; Stocker;
Tauter; Michael Thompson.
418
2017) VERY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 419
Ohio entertained twice as many such motions (fourteen) as any other dis-
trict.1 5 5 The next most represented districts are the District of Nebraska,156
and the Eastern District of Michigan,57 each with seven cases.
2. Threshhold Requirements
In order to rebut the presumption of abuse, the debtor must satisfy both
the requirements set forth in § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii)-(iv). These mandate that the
debtor submit certain documentation with respect to each additional expense
or adjustment to income that the debtor wishes the court to consider,158 and
the debtor must attest under oath to the accuracy of that submitted informa-
tion.159 The presumption of abuse may be rebutted only if the additional
expenses and/or adjustments to income would cause the debtor to pass the
means test.1 60
In many cases the court refuses to find special circumstances exist because
the debtor has failed to submit the required documentation,161 or the modifi-
155Armstrong; Barker; Burggraf; Castle; Conlee; Copeland; Hernandez; Melin; Polkiinghorn; Steven
Smith; Taylor; Thompson; Vaccariello; Witek.
i'Ferando; Herbert; Kowal; Ryder; Samson; Starkey; Wagner.
"Fudge; Heath; Maura; Meyers; Roach; Weinert; Wilson.
15811 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii) requires that the debtor provide "(I) documentation for such expense or
adjustment to income; and (II) a detailed explanation of the special circumstances that make such expenses
or adjustment to income necessary and reasonable." Id.
1'11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(BXiii).
16011 U.S.C. § 707(bX2)(B)(iv).
"'See Robbins v. Ervin (In re Ervin), No. 15-70467, 2016 WL 721043, at *12 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Feb.
23, 2016) (debtor failed to provide evidence as to itemized expenses and adjustment to income with
respect to two residences and long commutes); Robbins v. Alther (In re Alther), 537 B.R. 262, 269 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 2015) (concluding that debtors failed to provide documentation substantiating anticipated in-
come reduction); In re Hartley, No. 13-61182, 2014 WL 1329407, at *2 (Bankr. D. Or. Mar. 28, 2014)
(debtors failed to document unreimbursed health care costs); In re Martin, 505 B.R. 517 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa
2014) (Patrick Martin) (debtors failed to submit adequate documentation relating to claim that student
loans were special circumstances); In re Tedford, No. 14-00008, 2014 WL 3851129, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.
Iowa Aug. 5, 2014) (debtors failed to provide sufficiently detailed information on their monthly expenses);
In re Robinson, No. 12-02313, 2013 BL 279994, at *11-12 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Oct. 9, 2013) (debtor failed
to document deductions to account for spouse's individual expenses); In re Grover, No. 12-01069, 2013
WL 3994608 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Aug. 2, 2013) (debtor failed to show why expenses for personal clothing,
housing cost, and travel expenses were required by her job); In re Burdett, No. 12-12066, 2013 WL
865575, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 7, 2013) (debtor failed to demonstrate decline in commission income
based on new job); In re Grenardo, No. 11-25401, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 6302 (Bankr. D. Colo. May 2, 2012)
(debtor provided no documentary evidence as to monthly student loan amount); In re Inghilterra, No. 11-
11776, 2012 WL 1137008, at *8 (Bankr. D. Colo. Apr. 4, 2012) (increased child care expenses were not
documented); In re Mansfield, No. 11-06867, 2012 WL 627786, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2012)
(debtor did not provide itemized account for each additional commuting expense); In re Dejoy, No. 11-
10268, 2011 WL 5827319, at *5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011) (debtors failed to provide sufficient
documentation to support establish that support to aging family members constituted special circum-
stances); In re Greer, Nos. 10-63833, 10-62282, 10-62662, 10-62666, 2011 WL 10676936 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. Sept. 30, 2011) (debtors Greers, Lunn, Enriquezes and Hodsons failed to provide evidence to establish
that their expenses above the Internal Revenue Service allowances constituted "special circumstances"); In
re Katz, 451 B.R. 512 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011) (debtor failed to provide adequate documentary evidence to
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cations to income or expenses for which the debtor argues would not permit
the debtor to pass the means test.162
support claims that additional housing rental, car, education, childcare and healthcare expenses were spe-
cial circumstances); In re Leggett, No. 10-03383, 2011 WL 802806, at *9 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 2, 2011)
(debtor failed to provide documentation relating to wife's diagnosis with Graves disease); In re Ross, No.
10-81200, 2011 WL 482815, at *3 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Feb. 7, 2011) (debtor failed to provide any documen-
tation with respect to additional expenses); In re Stanley, 438 BR. 860, 866 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2010) (debtors
failed to show connection between wife's illness and excess expenses); In re Miller, No. 09-07528, 2010
WL 2670796, at *4-5 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. June 30, 2010) (debtor failed to document alleged reduction in
employment income and rental income); In re Robrock, 430 B.R. 197, 210 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010) (debtor
failed to provide documentation with respect to 401(k) loan payments, among other expenses); In re Tay-
lor, 417 BR. 762, 765 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009) (debtor failed to submit documentation with respect to
claimed expenses); In re Applegate, No. 08-15936--7, 2009 WL 9085555 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009)
(noting that debtors failed to produce any documentation relating to their anticipated income tax liability
or student loan obligation); In re Willis, 408 BR. 803, 810 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009) (debtors failed to offer
documentary evidence on child care costs or corroboration that decline in income was permanent);
DeAngelis v. Fonish (In re Fonash) 401 B.R. 143, 148 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008) (debtor failed to provide
documentation regarding his student loan expenses); In re Watkins, No. 07-6317, 20008 WL 2475749, at
*7 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 18, 2008) (debtors failed to show that 401(k) loan repayments were necessary and
reasonable); In re Goodall, No. 07-30219, 2007 WL 4868303 (Bankr. D.N.D. Sept. 14, 2007) (debtor did
not substantiate that she has serious medical condition); In re Witek, 383 B.R. 323, 329-330 (Bankr N.D.
Ohio 2007) (debtor failed to show how pending pregnancy would affect income or expenses); In re Martin,
371 B.R. 347, 356-357 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007) (Chad Martin) (debtors provided insufficient details about
excessive transportation costs and 401(k) loan repayments, but did provide adequate detail about drop in
income, payment of student loan, and birth of child); In re Pampas, 369 B.R. 290 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2007)
(even if debtor's pregnancy were special circumstances, debtor failed to itemize additional expenses result-
ing from that pregnancy); In re Mordis, No. 06-42590, 2007 WL 2962903, at * 5 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 9,
2007) (debtor did not provide necessary documentation with respect to loan repayment or voluntary
contributions to thrift savings plan); In re Singletary, 354 B.R. 455, 473-474 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006)
(debtors filed declaration of special circumstances, but provided no evidence and did not address issue at
hearing); In re Oliver, 350 B.R. 294, 303 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006) (debtor failed to provide documentary
evidence of how medical conditions affected income or expenses); In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 734 (Bankr
N.D. Tex. 2006) (debtor failed to sustain evidentiary burden to establish that $400 support payment for
girlfriend was special circumstance). Cf. In re Barker, No. 12-32954, 2013 WL 796171 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
Mar. 1, 2014) (discussing debtor's failure to establish special circumstances, although debtor filed no re-
sponse to motion to dismiss); In re Batzkeil, 349 B.R. 581 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2006) (concluding that debtor
had special circumstances, despite debtor's failure to file any response to motion to dismiss).
"52See Robbins v. Ervin (In re Ervin), No. 15-70467, 2016 WL 721043, at *12 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Feb.
23, 2016) (finding medical deductions insufficient to permit debtor to pass means test); Robbins v. Alther
(In re Alther), 537 B.R. 262, 269-70 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2015) (declining to consider whether payments for
disability insurance, life insurance or a health savings account constitute special circumstances because
even if deductions were taken debtors would still fail means test); In re Haskins, No. 15-40736, 2015 WL
7283059 (Bankr. D. Mass. Nov. 16, 2015) (allowing student loan deduction would not allow debtors to
pass means test); In re Strickland, 504 B.R. 542 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2014) (deductions for student loan
payments would not permit debtors to pass means test); In re Kowal, No. 12-82897, 2013 WL 5442018,
at *3 (Bankr. D. Neb. Sept. 27, 2013) (allowing payments on 401(k) loan did not permit debtors to pass
means test); U.S. Trustee v. Taborski (In re Taborski), No. 12-23966, 2013 WL 211116 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
Jan. 18, 2013) (allowing deductions for child support payments would not permit debtor to pass means
test); In re Polkinghorn, 436 BR. 484, 490 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010) (student loan payments and 401(k)
loan repayments would not allow debtor to pass means test); In re Rieck, 427 BR. 141, 148 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 2010) (claimed special circumstances for chapter 13 administrative expenses, excess transportation
costs and receipt of savings bond income would not allow debts to pass means test); McDow v. Meade (In
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3. Grounds for Rebutting Presumption of Abuse
If the debtor establishes that the debtor has a serious medical condition
or a call to active duty, the language of § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) expressly states that
special circumstances exist.163 However, for circumstances not so enumer-
ated, courts have followed one of two different approaches to applying the
statutory standard. Most courts have embraced what is commonly called the
"strict" or "narrow" approach, which requires the special circumstances to be
"out of the ordinary,"' 64 "unanticipated" or "unexpected" or "unforesee-
able,"165 "uncommon, unusual, exceptional, distinct, peculiar, particular,"166
"of a more severe nature than ordinary job changes or income fluctuations,"67
"beyond the control of the debtor,"168 "highly unusual, and of a type not
re Meade), 420 BR. 291, 313 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2009) (expenses to support drug-addicted son and four
minor grandchildren would not allow debtor to pass means test); In re Showers, No. 08-30359, 2008 WL
5786900 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 19, 2008) (deduction for student loan would not permit debtors to pass
means test); In re Robinette, No. 06-10585, 2007 WL 2955960, at *5 (Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 2, 2007)
(deductions for one-time job bonus, travel for child visitation, and student loan expenses do not allow
debtors to pass means test); In re Vaccariello, 375 BR. 809, 816 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (even including
payment on student lots debtors still had disposable income); In re Johns, 342 BR. 626, 629 (Bankr. E.D
Okla. 2006) (even if all debtors' figures were used, they would not pass means test).
'See Robbins v. Ervin (In re Ervin), No. 15-70467, 2016 WL 721043, at *14 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Feb.
23, 2016) (debtor had ruptured spleen, weakened immune system and torn Achilles tendon and had hyper-
somnia); In re Chabre, 531 B.R. 875, 879-880 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2015) (debtor had medical problems with
disks in her neck, was diabetic, and had a stomach bypass); In re Edwards, No. 09-09250, 2010 WL
1006890 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 2010) (debtor suffered a massive brain stem stroke and was totally
disabled).
164See In re Miller, No. 09-07528, 2010 WL 2670796, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. June 30, 2010); In re
Armstrong, No. 06-31414, 2007 WL 1544591, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 24, 2007); In re Delbecq, 368
BR. 754, 756-757 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2007); In re Tauter, 402 B.R. 903 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009); In re
Patterson, 392 B.R. 497 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008); In re Smith, 388 B.R. 885 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008); In re
Cribbs, 387 B.R 324 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008); In re Witek, 383 B.R 323, 330 (Bankr N.D. Ohio 2007); In re
Pageau, 383 B.R. 221, 226 (Bankr D.N.H. 2008).
s6 5See, e.g., In re Ross, No. 10-81200, 2011 WL 482815, at *3 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Feb. 7, 2011); In re
Miller, No. 09-07528, 2010 WL 2670796, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. June 30, 2010); In re Sparks, 360 B.R.
224, 230 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2006).
"In re Martin, 371 B.R. 347, 352 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007).
67See Robbins v. Ervin (In re Ervin), No. 15-70467, 2016 WL 721043, at *12 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Feb.
23, 2016); In re Burdett, No. 12-12066, 2013 WL 865575, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 7, 2013).
u6sSee, e.g., In re Fudge, No. 15-51518, 2016 WL 285449, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2016); In re
Mittelstaedt, No. 13-50225, 2014 WL 814038, at *3 (Bankr. D.S.D. Feb. 28, 2014); In re Greer, Nos. 10-
63833, 10-62282, 10-62662, 10-62666, 2011 WL 10676936, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2011); In re
Ross, No. 10-81200, 2011 WL 482815, at *3 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Feb. 7, 2011); In re Smith, 436 BR. 476,
481 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010) (Steven Smith); In re Polkinghorn, 436 BR. 484, 490 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2010); In re Roach, No. 09-76184, 2010 BL 217714, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2010); In re Miller,
No. 09-07528, 2010 WL 2670796, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. June 30, 2010); In re Fechter, 456 B.R 65, 74
(Bankr. D. Mont. 2010); In re Rieck, 427 B.R. 141, 146-147 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010); In re Stocker, 399
BR. 522, 530 (M.D. Fla. 2008); In re Lightsey, 374 BR. 377, 382 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007); In re Tranmer,
355 BR. 234, 251 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2006).
422 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 91
normally encountered by most debtors,"169 and "leave[ ] the debtor with no
reasonable alternative but to incur the expense."o70 Under this approach,
courts interpret the language to "set this bar extremely high, placing it effec-
tively off limits for most debtors."'7' These courts view the insertion of the
explicit inclusion for "a serious medical condition or a call or order to active
duty in the Armed Forces" as limiting the nature of events constituting spe-
cial circumstances under the canon of statutory interpretation ejusdem
generis.172
The other school of thought is sometimes called the broad approach.
These courts see the examples of special circumstances provided in the stat-
ute as mere examples rather than limiting in nature,73 and do not require
that the special circumstances be outside of the debtor's control,174 or unan-
ticipated.75 The broad approach, with which commentators have generally
agreed,176 is more consistent with the legislative history for two reasons.
'69See In re Maura, 491 B.R. 493, 512 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); In re Polkinghorn, 436 BR. 484, 490
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010); In re Burggraf, 436 BR. 466, 472 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010).
o70See In re Armstrong, 2007 WL 1544591, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 24, 2007).
"In re Haar, 360 BR. 759 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2007); see also In re Wagner, No. 07-42262,
2008 BL 53424, at *2 (Bankr. D. Neb. Mar. 14, 2008); In re Parulan, 387 B.R. 168 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008);
In re Samson, No. 08-80615, 2008 WL 2949250, at *2 (Bankr. D. Neb. July 28, 2008).
1
72
Latin for "of the same kind," the canon suggests that when certain examples are listed (as in a
statute), and a more general phrase is also used that may include other things, the other things must be of
the same kind as the specific examples provided. See, e.g., In re Fudge, No. 15-51518, 2016 WL 285449, at
*1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2016); In re Mittelstaedt, No. 13-50225, 2014 WL 814038, at *3 (Bankr.
D.S.D. Feb. 28, 2014); In re Martin, 491 BR. 493, 511 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); In re Burggraf, 436 B.R.
466, 471 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010); In Te Taylor, 417 B.R. 762, 765 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009); In re Smith,
388 BR. 885, 888 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008) (Earl Smith); In re Naut, No.07-20280, 2008 WL 191297, at *10
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2008).
'
73
See, e.g., In re Champagne, 389 BR. 191, 202 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008) (stating that 'the two statutory
circumstances are mere examples to assure protection of debtors in the referenced categories from a finding
of abuse"); In re Robinette, No. 06-10585, 2007 WL 2955960, at *4 (Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 2, 2007) (opin-
ing that the two examples "are not the only circumstances that debtors may cite, nor even archetypal
circumstances"); In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. 754, 758 (Bankr. S.D. Ind., 2007) (noting that examples were not
"intended to define, qualify or otherwise limit the meaning of 'special circumstances.'").
171See In re Martin, 505 B.R. 517, 520-521 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2014); In re Armstrong, 2007 WL
1544591 at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 24, 2007); In re Turner, 376 BR. 370, 378 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007);
In re Littman, 370 B.R. 820, 831 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007); In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 313 (Bankr. D. Del.
2007); In re Graham, 363 B.R. 844, 850 (Bankr S.D. Ohio 2007); In re Tamez, No. 07-60047, 2007 WL
2329805 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2007); In re Thompson, 350 B.R 770, 777 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006).
asSee, e.g., In re Robinette, No. 06-10585, 2007 WL 2955960, at *4 (Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 2, 2007); In
re Armstrong, 2007 WL 1544591 at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 24, 2007).
1'7 See, e.g., 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 707.05[2][d] (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th ed. rev.
2006) (suggesting that special circumstances could be established for "high commuting costs, the increased
price of gas, security costs in dangerous neighborhoods, or the cost of infant formula and diapers" or any
other "legitimate expense that is out of the ordinary for an average family, or that may have increased since
the IRS guidelines were calculated"); Keith M. Lundin & William H. Brown, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY,
4th ed, § 487.1, at $ [4], Sec. Rev. Apr. 14, 2009, www.Chl3online.com (identifying as potential special
circumstances "lost jobs, domestic relations problems, children in trouble, natural disasters, car wrecks"
and stating that special circumstances is not as "demanding or difficult as an undue hardship"); Roma Perez,
VERY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
First, Congress used the term "special circumstances," intentionally rejecting
the phrase "extraordinary circumstances" which, as discussed above, had been
proposed in prior versions of the means test.177 This change in nomenclature
suggests that Congress intended the facts that would overcome the presump-
tion of abuse to be something less than extraordinary. In fact, the report of
the Senate Judiciary Committee emphasized that the standard was "to pro-
tect debtors from rigid and arbitrary application of a means-test."178 While
the special circumstances doctrine was "not [to] be used as a convenient way
for debtors to choose a more expensive lifestyle,"179 it was to be available to
"those debtors whose special circumstances require adjustments to income or
expenses that place them in dire need of chapter 7 relief." 80
Second, the courts that apply the doctrine of ejusdem generis fail to under-
stand the genesis of the explicit statutory inclusion for "a serious medical
condition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed Forces" in
§ 707(b)(2)(B)(i). As discussed above,181 it was inserted specifically because
members of Congress believed that the phrase "special circumstances" might
be read too narrowly and exclude such events as those described in that
phrase, not because they were trying to define the types of events that could
constitute special circumstances. As one of the courts adopting the broad
approach to special circumstances noted, the examples were intended to be
"expansive - not limiting."' 82
One of the most frequently-invoked bases for asserting that special cir-
cumstances exist relates to retirement accounts. Under § 1322(f), added by
BAPCPA,183 amounts required to repay a loan from a qualified pension plan
do not constitute "disposable income" for purposes of § 1325.184 Debtors
argue that, because such amounts would not be available to creditors in chap-
ter 13, they should not be considered in computing the presumption of abuse
Not "Special" Enough for Chapter 7: An Analysis of the Special Circumstances Provision of the Bankruptcy
Code, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 983, 1014 (2013) (stating that the "more moderate approach" to the interpre-
tation of § 707(b)(2)(B) is "better-reasoned analysis"); Charles J. Tabb & Jillian K. McClelland, Living with
the Means Test, 31 S. ILL. U. LJ. 463, 498 (2007) (suggesting that "almost anything could qualify, as long
as the debtor can show necessity, reasonableness, and lack of a reasonable alternative").
177See text at note 83 supra.
171S. REP. No. 106-49, 106th Cong. 1st Sess., at 7 (May 11, 1999).
179Id.
1Iod.
i1 See text at notes 114-118 supra.
182See, e.g., In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 314 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (emphasis in original); see also In re
Sanders, 454 B.R. 855, 859-861 (2011).
"'Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 224(d) (2005).
154Section 1322(f) states that a chapter 13 plan "may not materially alter the terms of a loan described
in section 362(b)(19) and any amounts required to repay such loan shall not constitute 'disposable income'
under section 1325." Section 362(b)(19) allows withholding of income from debtor's wages for the benefit
of a qualified pension plan "to the extent that the amounts withheld and collected are used solely for
payments relating to a loan from a plan . . . ."
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in chapter 7 either. To do otherwise would force debtors into chapter 13
even when creditors would not receive any additional distribution under that
chapter, which constitutes "special circumstances." Although some courts
have found that the need to repay 401(k) loans constitutes "special circum-
stances,"18 others reject that argument, unless the circumstances urrounding
the underlying loan were themselves special.'86
A related claim is that voluntary contributions to pension plans should be
considered special circumstances, especially when the debtor is older and re-
'asSee, e.g., In re Kowal, No. 12-82897, 2013 WL 5442018, at *3 (Bankr. D. Neb. Sept. 27, 2013); In re
Cribbs, 387 B.R. 324 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008); In re Herbert, No. 07-40224, 2007 WL 6363172, at * 6
(Bankr. D. Neb. May 21, 2007); In re Lenton, 358 B.R 651, 662 (Bankr. E.D Pa. 2006), appeal dismissed as
moot, Lenton v. U.S. Trustee, No. 007-178, 2009 WL 1872667 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2009); In re Thompson,
350 B.R. 770 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006) (Gregory Thompson), revd sub nom. Eisen v. Thompson, 370 B.R.
762 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
1s
6 See, e.g., Egebjerg v. Anderson (In re Egebjerg), 574 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009) (reversing
bankruptcy court on this issue); In re Weinert, No. 11-69840, 2013 WL 1694482, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
Apr. 11, 2013); In re Barker, No. 12-32954, 2013 WL 796171, at * 5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2013); In
re DeJoy, No. 11-10268, 2011 WL 5827319, at *5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011); In re Polkinghorn,
436 BR. 484, 490 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010); In re Siler, 426 B.R. 167, 173 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2010); In re
Roach, No. 09-76184, 2010 BL 217714, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2010); In re Tauter, 402 B.R.
903, 907 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009); In re Jackson, No. 07-21717, 2008 WL 5539790, at * 3 (Bankr. D. Kan.
Dec. 5, 2008); In re Samson, No. 08-80615, 2008 WL 2949250, at *2 (Bankr. D. Neb. July 28, 2008); In re
Watkins, No. 07-6317, 2008 WL 2475749, at *7 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 18, 2007); In re Smith, 388 B.R.
885, 888 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008) (Earl Smith); In re Darling, No. 07-10746, 2008 WL 2278901, at *1
(Bankr. D. Vt. May 19, 2008); In re Mowris, 384 B.R. 235, 240-241 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2008); In re
Turner, 376 BR. 370, 379 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007); In re Scarafiotti, 375 BR. 618 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007); cf.
McVay v. Otero, 371 BR. 190, 205 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on whether
401(k) loan repayments were special circumstances in this particular case); In re Montalto, 537 BR. 147,
160 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015) (although debtor did not claim special circumstances, court stated that 401(k)
loan repayment would not constitute special circumstances under facts of the case); In re Nabulsi, No. 11-
65698, 2013 WL 3784188, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 16, 2013) (debtor abandoned argument of special
circumstances, but court noted that 401(k) loan repayments are 'ordinarily insufficient to constitute spe-
cial circumstances.").
Courts have also rejected attempts to deduct 401(k) loan repayments from the computation of the
means test itself, holding that such payments are not payments on a "debt," see McVay v. Otero, 371 B.R.
190, 203 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Eisen v. Thompson, 370 B.R. 762, 772 (N.D. Ohio 2007); Robbins v. Alther
(In re Alther), 537 BR. 262, 267-68 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2015); In re Montalto, 537 B.R. 147, 159 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2015); In re Hartley, No. 13-61182, 2014 WL 1329407, at *3 (Bankr. D. Or. Mar. 28, 2014); In
re Robrock, 430 BR. 197, 210 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010); In re Smith, 388 BR. 885, 888 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
2008) (Earl Smith); In re Mowris, 384 B.R. 235, 238 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2008); In re Samson, No. 08-
80615, 2008 WL 2949250, at *2 (Bankr. D. Neb. July 28, 2008); In re Mordis, No. 06-42590, 2007 WL
2962903, at * 3 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2007); In re Turner, 376 BR. 370, 375 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007); In
re Lewis, No. 07-32371, 2007 WL 2742854 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2007); or an "other necessary
expense," see In re Koch, 408 B.R. 539 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009); In re Mowris, 384 B.R. 235, 238-239
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2008); In re Turner, 376 B.R. 370, 375 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007); In re Mordis, No. 06-
42590, 2007 WL 2962903, at * 3 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2007); In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 730-31
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). See generally Luke Welmerink, Cleaning the Mess of the Means Test: The Need
for a Case-by-Case Analysis of 401(k) Loans in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petitions, 41 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REv. 121 (2010).
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lying on that pension upon retirement.18 7 Under § 541(b)(7), also added to
the Bankruptcy Code by BAPCPA, 88 "any amount . . . withheld by an em-
ployer from the wages of employees for payment as contributions .. . to ... [a
qualified] employee benefit plan" is excluded from property of the estate and
"such amount . . . shall not constitute disposable income as defined in section
1325(b)(2)."1 89 No similar exclusion applies to chapter 7, and the argument
that special circumstances exist in a chapter 7 case because voluntary contri-
butions to pension plans might be excludable from the computation of dispos-
able income in a chapter 13 case is uniformly unsuccessful.190
Another frequent assertion is that the debtor's obligation to make pay-
ments on nondischargeable student loans constitutes special circumstances
that rebut the presumption of abuse. The issue has divided the bankruptcy
courts. Some courts have accepted this position,191 and other courts have
disagreed, at least under the circumstances.present in the case before them.19 2
"'See, e.g., In re Anderson, 444 BR. 505, 507 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2011).
as8Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 323 (2005).
18911 U.S.C. § 541(bX7).
'"0See Robbins v. Alther (In re Alther), 537 BR. 262, 268-269 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2015); In re Ander-
son, 444 BR. 505, 508 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Fechter, 456 B.R 65, 73 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010); In
re Siler, 426 B.R. 167, 173 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2010); In re Tauter, 402 BR. 903, 906 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2009); In re Mravik, 399 B.R. 202, 206 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008); In re Mordis, No. 06-42590, 2007 WL
2962903, at * 4 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2007); In re Robinette, No. 06-10585, 2007 WL 2955960, at *5
(Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 2, 2007); In re Scarafiotti, 375 BR. 618 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007); In re Herbert, No.
07-40224, 2007 WL 6363172, at *5 (Bankr. D. Neb. May 21, 2007). Cf. In re Thomas, No. 12-12205
(Bankr. D. Del. July 27, 2012) (court granted motion to dismiss without specifying reasoning, but debtor
had claimed that need to make voluntary 401(k) contributions was special circumstance).
'91See In re Bradley, No. 13-01390, 2013 WL 4663215 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Aug. 30, 2013); In re Howell,
477 B.R. 314, 317 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Thompson, 457 B.R. 872, 882 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011)
(Michael Thompson); In re Sanders, 454 B.R. 855 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2011); In re Martin, 371 B.R. 347,
356 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007); In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. 754, 759 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2007); In re Robinette, No.
06-10585, 2007 WL 2955960, at *5 (Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 2, 2007); In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 318
(Bankr. D. Del. 2007); In re Templeton, 365 BR. 213, 216-217 (Bankr. W.D Okla. 2007). Cf. In re
Thurston, No. 07-35092 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2008) (refusing to dismiss case under § 707(b)(3)
because of nondischargeable student debt).
192See In re Fudge, No. 15-51518, 2016 WL 285449 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2016); In re Maura,
491 B.R. 493, 512 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); In re Edwards, No. 12-00603, 2012 WL 3042233, at *7
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. July 25, 2012); In re Grenardo, No. 11-25401, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 6302 (Bankr. D. Colo.
May 2, 2012); In re Campbell, No. 11-51573, 2012 WL 162287 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 18, 2012); In re
Harmon, 446 B.R. 721, 729-733 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011); In re Hammock, 436 B.R. 343, 356 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 2010); In re Conlee, 435 B.R. 490 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010); In re Rold, No. 07-04259, 2010 WL
4065082, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Oct. 15, 2010); In re Polkinghorn, 436 B.R. 484, 490 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2010); In re Burggraf, 436 B.R. 466, 471 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010); In re Womer, 427 BR. 334, 337 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 2010); In re Siler, 426 B.R. 167, 173 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2010); In re Willson, No. 09-02811, 2010
WL 1509288, at *1 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2010); In re Carrillo, 421 B.R. 540, 546 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
2009); In re Patterson, 392 B.R. 497, 507 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008); In re Champagne, 389 B.R. 191, 200-201
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2008); In re Pageau, 383 BR. 221, 228 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008); In ye Wagner, No. 07-42262,
2008 BL 53424, at *4 (Bankr. D. Neb. Mar. 14, 2008); In re Vaccariello, 375 B.R. 809, 816 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2007). See generally Benjamin A. Cohen-Kurzrock, It's Not Abusive or Personal: Student Loans and
11 U.S.C. § 707, 52 Hous. L. REv. 1197 (2015); Antony P. Cali, Note, The "Special Circumstance" of
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A debtor's claim that his or her other ongoing expenses in excess of those
allowed by the means test should be considered special circumstances have
rarely succeeded19 However, some debtors have established special circum-
stances when the excess expenses are attributable to family exigencies. The
following facts have been cited in finding special circumstances on the basis of
increased expenses:
* The cost of maintaining separate households borne by debtors who
Student Loan Debt Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 52
ARIz. L. REV. 473 (2010).
'95See, e.g., Robbins v. Ervin (In re Ervin), No. 15-70467, 2016 WL 721043, at *13 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
Feb. 23, 2016) (rejecting as special circumstances expenses related to ninety-seven mile round trip com-
mute, need to get new car, purchase of partnership interest, tax liability on partnership income); In re
Hurst, No. 13-05987, 2014 WL 2809026, at *3 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. June 20, 2014) (expenses related to
debtors' commutes of seventy miles and ninety-five miles, respectively, do not create special circum-
stances); In re Hartley, No. 13-61182, 2014 WL 5474295, at *3 (Bankr. D. Or. Mar. 28, 2014) (proposed
expenses to make badly needed repairs to bathroom in home were not special circumstances because there
was reasonable alternative, giving up the home); In re Kowal, No. 12-82897, 2013 WL 5442018, at *2
(Bankr. D. Neb. Sept. 27, 2013) (additional expenses for automobiles, home repairs, not special circum-
stances); In re Maura, 491 B.R. 493, 511 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (Catholic school tuition not special
circumstances); In re Thomas, No. 12-12205 (Bankr. D. Del. July 25, 20120 (court did not accept debtor's
claim of need for extra cars and extra expenses for commuting); In re Pignotti, No. 07-04109, 2011 WL
1299616 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Apr. 1, 2011) (excess transportation costs because of long commute from house
to which debtors moved not special circumstances); In re Thompson, 457 B.R. 872, 882 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2011) (Michael Thompson) (prospective medical expenses not special circumstances); In re Fechter, 456
B.R 65, 73-74 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010) (real estate business expenses do not constitute special circum-
stances); In re Wise, No. 10-32441, 2011 WL 2133843 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. May 27, 2011) (desire to save for
children's education expenses not special circumstances); In re Rieck, 427 B.R. 141, 148 (Bankr. D. Minn.
2010) (excess transportation costs for automobiles used by debtors' children to travel to school not special
circumstances); In re DeJoy, No. 11-10268, 2011 WL 5827319, at *4 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011)
(rejecting claim that expenses of older model vehicles demonstrate special circumstances); In re Linville,
446 B.R. 522 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011) (college expenses of adult children do not create special circum-
stances); In re Ross, No. 10-81200, 2011 WL 482815, at *3 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Feb. 7, 2011) (amounts
debtor wished to put aside for future home, car, education not special circumstances); In re Taylor, 417
B.R. 762, 765 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009) (expenses incurred as a result of divorce not special circumstances);
In re Tauter, 402 B.R. 903, 907 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (potential need to replace fourteen-year-old
vehicle not special circumstances); In re Patterson, 392 B.R. 497, 505-506 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (expenses
of storage unit, food expenses for truck driver while on the road, and living expenses for adult college
student not special circumstances); In re Shinkle, 382 BR. 85 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2008) (additional housing
expenses for house larger than debtors currently needed not special circumstances); In re Naut, No. 07-
20280, 2008 WL 191297, at *10 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2008) (debtor's inability to run a profitable
business and to sell home at a profit not special circumstances); In re Lightsey, 374 BR. 377, 382 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 2007) (obligation to pay large deficiency judgment relating to car loan incurred during prior
marriage not special circumstances); In re Starkey, No. 06-81473, 2007 WL 6364773, at *3 (Bankr. D.
Neb. Jan. 25, 2007) (living in an expensive area does not constitute special circumstances); In re Herbert,
No. 07-40224, 2007 WL 6363172, at *5 (Bankr. D. Neb. May 21, 2007) (finding no special circumstances
in debtors' housing expenses in excess of those allowed by local standard); In re Delunas, No. 06-43133,
2007 WL 737763, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2007) (no special circumstances requiring family to live
in house large enough to give each child own bedroom); In re Ferando, No. 06-81855, 2007 WL 6364774
(Bankr. D. Neb. Mar. 1, 2007) (unusually high commissions during six months prior to bankruptcy filing
not special circumstances).
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were living apart, either because of a legal separation,94 or the re-
quirements of employment.19s
* High vehicle operation expenses for debtors who lived in a rural area
and needed to commute significant distances to their respective places
of employment, beginning at 4:30 a.m., when they had a history of
collisions with deer.196
* Providing substantial support to debtor's eighty-one-year-old mother,
and her sister who was in chronically poor health, a disabled niece and
nephew, and an elderly aunt.197
* Increased postpetition medical and automotive expenses.198
* Debtor's pre-bankruptcy pregnancy and postpetition birth of addi-
tional child.199
* Child support payment obligations imposed on debtor pursuant o
post-filing divorce decree.200
* Transportation expenses to visit children.2 01
* Modest increase in housing allowance for home in safe neighborhood
where child with mental and emotional difficulties could attend
school where he was thriving and where debtors could access after-
school child care assistance of extended family.202
Prior to Hamilton v. Lanning,203 some courts were sympathetic to argu-
ments that special circumstances exist if the debtor's projected income was
substantially lower than that used to compute "current monthly income" for
purposes of the means-test computation.204 But in general arguments relating
194See In re Armstrong, No. 06-31414, 2007 WL 1544591, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 24, 2007).
195See In re Graham, 363 BR. 844, 850 (Bankr S.D. Ohio 2007). But see Robbins v. Ervin (In re Ervin),
No. 15-70467, 2016 WL 721043, at *12 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2016) (suggesting that need to main-
tain separate address because of employment would not constitute special circumstances).
''See In re Batzkeil, 349 BR. 581 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2006). But cf. In re Mansfield, No. 11-06867,
2012 WL 627786, at *3 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2012) (concluding that because debtor could use a more
fuel efficient vehicle for his commute, high costs were not special circumstances); In re Tranmer, 355 B.R.
234, 251 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2006) (suggesting that long commute could be avoided by chapter 13 debtors if
they relocated their residence, and did not constitute special circumstances).
'57See In re Chabre, 531 B.R. 875 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2015).
"'See In re Hunt, No. 08-06916, Dkt. 35 (Bankr S.D. Ind. Dec. 18, 2008).
"9See In re Inghilterra, No. 11-11776, 2012 WL 1137008, at *8 (Bankr. D. Colo. Apr. 4, 2012); In re
Martin, 371 B.R. 347, 355 (Bankr C.D. Ill. 2007).
2
"See In re Littman, 370 B.R. 820 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007).
201See In re Robinette, No. 06-10585, 2007 WL 2955960, at *5 (Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 2, 2007).
202See In re Scarafiotti, 375 B.R. 618 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007).
20 3
Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505 (2010). See discussion at notes 142-148 supra.
204See In re Murzyn, No. 08.15279, Dkt. 56 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 22, 2009); In re Smith, No. 08-
31131, 2008 WL 6069509 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 2008) (Carrie Smith); In re Binninger, No. 07-00203,
2007 WL 3091584, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Oct. 19, 2007); In re Robinette, No. 06-10585, 2007 WL
2955960, at *5 (Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 2, 2007); In re Tamez, No. 07-60047, 2007 WL 2329805 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2007); In re Heath, 371 B.R. 806 (E.D. Mich. 2007); In re Melin, No. 06-32652
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2006).
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to the debtor's lower income have not been successful.205 One debtor suc-
cessfully claimed special circumstances to allow the debtor to exclude unem-
ployment benefits received by debtor's alcoholic brother who was living with
debtor when debtor claimed that the benefits were not used for household
expenses.206 Another successfully argued that an adjustment in income con-
stituted special circumstances because the debtor was retiring from her high-
paying job.2 07 But a debtor who attempted to exclude a civil service retire-
ment system pension that was paid in lieu of social security benefits as special
circumstances was not successful.20 8
And although the purpose behind the means test was to compel a con-
sumer debtor into a chapter 13 or chapter 11 case when the computations
demonstrated that the debtor had the ability to make a meaningful payment
on his or her unsecured debts through dedication of future income, courts
have also almost uniformly rejected the contention that the fact that a chap-
20sSee In re Mittelstaedt, No. 13-50225, 2014 WL 814038, at *3 (Bankr. D.S.D. Feb. 28, 2014)
(debtor's decreased income because debtor chose to retire and move to Florida not special circumstances);
In re Wilson, No. 14-30234 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2014) (debtor claimed reduced overtime, but actual
income was higher); In re Kowal, No. 12-82897, 2013 WL 5442018, at *2 (Bankr. D. Neb. Sept. 27, 2013)
(decreased income and child support payments not special circumstances); In re Copeland, No. 12-32287,
2013 WL 1289154, at * 5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2013) (rejecting argument hat temporary decline in
income due to post-petition unemployment and depression over death of wife constituted special circum-
stances); In re Burdett, No. 12-12066, 2013 WL 865575, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 7, 2013) (finding
$13,160 decline in income insufficient to establish special circumstances); In re Chambers, No. 10-00856,
2011 WL 4479690, at * 4 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa June 7, 2011) (concluding debtor failed to show that overall
income decreased significantly since filing bankruptcy petition); In re Wise, No. 10-32441, 2011 WL
2133843 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. May 27, 2011) (debtor's anticipated loss of child support payments not special
circumstances); In re Smith, 436 B.R. 476, 481 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010) (Steven Smith) (fluctuations in
income because debtors no longer getting overtime did not constitute special circumstances); In re Fechter,
456 B.R 65, 73-74 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010) (prospective loss of child support payments does not constitute
special circumstances); In re Rieck, 427 BR. 141, 148 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010) (one-time receipt of savings
bond income not special circumstances); In re Cotto, 425 BR. 72, 77-78 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010) (receipt of
non-recurring wage settlement not special circumstances); In re Rudnick, 435 BR. 613, 615 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 2010) (decreased income because of prospective demotions not special circumstances); In re Show-
ers, No. 08-30359, 2008 WL 5786900 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 19, 2008) (potential reduction in income due
to reduced overtime not special circumstances); In re Hernandez, No. 08-31588, 2008 WL 5441279, at *5
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio Dec. 1, 2008) (debtor's decision to decrease number of hours worked was not special
circumstances); In re Budig, 387 B.R. 12 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2008) (claim of less income because of abnor-
mally harsh winter was not special circumstances); In re Binninger, No. 07-00203, 2007 WL 3091584, at
*3 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Oct. 19, 2007) (rejecting contention that debtor would not have as much overtime
in the future as during the six month prior to the bankruptcy filing); In re Ryder, No. 07-40538, Dkt. 29
(Bankr. D. Neb. July 20, 2007) (debtor voluntarily quit second job, so loss of income was not special
circumstances); In re Herbert, No. 07-40224, 2007 WL 6363172, at * 6 (Bankr. D. Neb. May 21, 2007)
(reduction in debtors' overtime income not special circumstances). Cf. In re Nabulsi, No. 11-65698, 2013
WL 3784188, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 16, 2013) (debtor abandoned argument for special circum-
stances, but court stated that "a reduction in employment compensation does not constitute a special
circumstance, but rather is quite a common occurrence for those who file Chapter 7 bankruptcies.").
21See In re Meyers, No. 09-77897, 2010 BL 217090 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 2010).
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See In re Mathews, No. 15-31680 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Oct. 20, 2015).
20.See In re Moose, No. 11-51816, 2012 WL 954713 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Mar. 20, 2012).
2017) VERY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 429
ter 13 plan would provide creditors no additional payout does not constitute
special circumstances rebutting the presumption of abuse.2 09
4. Success of Attempts to Rebut Presumption of Abuse
In most cases in which the debtor attempts to rebut the presumption of
abuse, the debtor is unsuccessful. Of the 129 cases in the study, in only
twenty-seven did the court conclude that the debtor had presented special
circumstances sufficient to rebut the presumption,2 10 one of which was re-
versed on appeal,21" and in two others the court ordered that the case be
converted or dismissed under § 707(b)(3).212 In another case, the court de-
2"See In re DeJoy, No. 11-10268, 2011 WL 5827319, at *6 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011); In re
Fechter, 456 B.R 65, 71 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010); In re Tauter, 402 B.R. 903, 908 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009);
In re Darling, No. 07-10746, 2008 WL 2278901, at *1 (Bankr. D. Vt. May 19, 2008); In re Smith, 388 B.R.
885, 889 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008) (Earl Smith); In re Pageau, 383 B.R. 221, 230 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008); In re
Castle, 362 B.R. 846, 850-851 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006); In re Johns, 342 B.R. 626, 629 (Bankr. E.D. Okla.
2006); but see In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. 754, 760 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2007) (stating "there is simply no logic to
essentially forcing a debtor into a Chapter 13 case if the distribution in that case will yield nothing to
unsecured creditors."); cf. In re Harmon, 446 B.R. 721, 731-732 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (concluding that
debtor failed to establish that unsecured creditors would not receive meaningful distribution in chapter
13); In re Siler, 426 B.R. 167, 177 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2010) (to use means test to deny chapter 7 relief to
debtors who cannot pay unsecured creditors in chapter 13 "is absurd and contrary to the purpose of the
Means Test."); In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 731-733 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (declining to decide whether
the fact that debtor would have no projected disposable income in chapter 13 constitutes special circum-
stances). Cf. also In re Persaud, 486 B.R. 251, 264 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013) (fact that a majority of
household income is not controlled by debtor and thus may not be available to fund chapter 13 plan not
special circumstances); In re Stocker, 399 B.R. 522, 532 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (antenuptial agreement under
which husband would not be liable for debts of debtor/wife under chapter 13 plan is not special circum-
stances); In re Oliver, 350 B.R. 294, 303 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006) (debtor's past failure with a debt
consolidation plan does not constitute special circumstances).
2 10See In re Chabre, 531 B.R. 875 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2015); In re Mathews, No. 15-31680 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. Oct. 20, 2015); In re Bradley, No. 13-01390, 2013 WL 4663215 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Aug. 30, 2013); In
re Howell, 477 B.R. 314 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Sanders, 454 B.R. 855 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2011); In
re Siler, 426 B.R. 167 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2010); In re Meyers, No. 09-77897, 2101 BL 217090 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Sept. 2, 2010); In re Edwards, No. 09-09250, 2010 WL 1006890 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 2010)
(Judith Edwards); In re Murtyn, No. 08-15279, Dkt. 56 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 22, 2009); In re Hunt, No.
08-06916, Dkt. 35 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Dec. 18, 2008); In re Cribbs, 387 B.R. 324 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008); In re
Smith, No. 08-31131, 2008 WL 6069509 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 2008) (Carrie Smith); In re Turner,
376 B.R. 370 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007); In re Scarafiotti, 375 B.R. 618 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007); In re Heath,
371 B.R. 806 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007); In re Tamez, No. 07-60047, 2007 WL 2329805 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
Aug. 13, 2007); In re Martin, 371 B.R. 347 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007) (Chad Martin); In re Littman, 370 B.R.
820 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007); In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. 754 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2007); In re Haman, 366 B.R.
307 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007); In re Templeton, 365 B.R. 213 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2007); In re Graham, 363
B.R. 844 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007); In re Lenton, 358 B.R 651, 662 (Bankr. E.D Pa. 2006), appeal dismissed
as moot, Lenton v. U.S. Trustee, No. 07-178, 2009 WL 1872667 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2009); In re Thomp-
son, 350 B.R. 770 (Bank. N.D. Ohio 2006) (Gregory Thompson), rev'd sub nom. Eisen v. Thompson, 370
B.R. 762 (N.D. Ohio 2007); In re Batzkiel, No. 06-00355 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Apr. 21, 2006); In re Arm-
strong, No. 06-31414 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 13, 2006).
2 1Eisen v. Thompson, 370 B.R. 762 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
2 12Lenton v. U.S. Trustee, No. 07-178, 2009 WL 1872667 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2009); In re Meyers, No.
09-77897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 11, 2009).
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clined to dismiss despite the fact that the debtor had failed to rebut the
presumption of abuse,213 an exercise of discretion that most courts have con-
cluded they do not have.2 14 That means that in only twenty-five cases
(fewer than one in five of all those cases in which the debtor attempted to
rebut the presumption), the debtor prevailed on the motion to dismiss and
was permitted to remain in chapter 7.
As the following chart demonstrates, successful efforts to rebut the pre-
sumption of abuse before bankruptcy judges have tracked the total number of
cases in which the trustee has filed motions to dismiss based on the presump-
tion, and both have declined dramatically since 2007.
Number of Successful Assertions of Special Circumstances Before
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5. Disposition of Case
One might expect that in most cases in which a motion to dismiss is made
based on the presumption of abuse in which the debtor fails to rebut the
presumption, the debtor would convert the case to one under chapter 13 in
order to obtain the benefits of bankruptcy protection. In fact, such a conver-
sion occurs only about half the cases. In the other cases, the chapter 7 case is
simply dismissed.215
21I7 re Mravik, No. 08-28754 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Aug. 12, 2008).
2 14
See, e.g., Justice v. Advanced Control Solutions, Inc., No. 07-5231, 2008 WL 4368668 (W.D. Ark.
Sept. 22, 2008), affd, 639 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2011); In re Woodruff, 416 B.R. 369, 373 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2009); In re Witek, 383 B.R. 323 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2997); In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 311 (Bankr. D. Del.
2007). But see In re Siler, 426 B.R. 167, 177 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2010); In re Skvorecz, 369 B.R. 638, 642
(Bankr. D. Colo. 2007) (concluding that the court need not dismiss the case if chapter 13 would not
benefit creditors).
215
1n one case, the court granted the motion of the U.S. trustee to dismiss the case, the debtor ap-
pealed the order, and the U.S. trustee petitioned the district court to remand to the bankruptcy court
because debtor's circumstances had changed. When the case was remanded, the U.S. trustee withdrew
the motion to dismiss. See In re Pampas, No. 06-10936 (Bankr. M.D. La. Oct. 27, 2006).
(Vol. 91
2017) VERY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 431
Converted to Converted to Dismissed
chapter 13 chapter 11
52216 2217 46218
Even in those cases in which the debtor agreed to convert the case, some
resulted in dismissal of the converted case, often within a very short time.219
Some were subsequently reconverted to chapter 7 where they were success-
fully concluded with a discharge.220 When the debtor's chapter 7 case was
dismissed, in some cases the debtor filed yet another chapter 7 case within
the next year or so, and the trustee did not move to dismiss the second
case,2 2 1 or moved to dismiss under § 707(b)(3) and the debtor converted the
case.2 2 2  In others, although the debtor did not convert the case to avoid
dismissal, the debtor filed a chapter 13 case shortly after dismissal,2 2 3 or re-
opened the dismissed case in order to file a motion to convert.22 4
So is the means test, with its rebuttable presumption of abuse and special
circumstances doctrine successfully forcing debtors into chapter 13 and chap-
216Anderson; Barker Barraza; Budig; Champagne; Conlee; Darling; Dejoy; Delunas; Enriquez; Ervin;
Fechter; Fonash; Goodall; Greer Hammock; Harmon; Hartley; Herbert; Hodson; Hurst; Inghilterra; Jackson;
Kowal; Leggett; Lightsey; Linville; Lunn; Mansfield; Patrick Martin; Maura; Meade; Moose; Mowris; Pageau;
Patterson; Polkinghorn; Robinson; Rudnick; Samson; Earl Smith; Stanley; Starkey; Stocker, Tauter; Thomas;
Vaccariello; Wagner; Willis; Willson; Wise; Womer.
217Campbell; Strickland.
2 1
8Alther; Applegate; Binninger; Burdett; Burggraf; Carrillo; Castle; Chambers; Copeland; Cotto; Marcus
Edwards; Egebjerg; Ferando; Fudge; Grenardo; Grover; Haskins; Hernandez; Johns; Katz; Miller; Mittel-
staedt; Mordis; Naut; Oliver; Persaud; Pignotti; Rieck; Roach; Robrock; Robinette; Rold; Ross; Ryder; Shin-
kle; Showers; Singletary; Steven Smith; Taborski; Taylor; Tedford; Michael Thompson; Watkins; Weinert;
Wilson; Witek.
2 19Anderson (dismissed less than two months after conversion); Conlee (dismissed seven months after
conversion; debtor filed another chapter 7 case nineteen months later in which trustee did not file motion
to dismiss); Enriquez (dismissed nine months after conversion); Hammock (dismissed ten months after
conversion); Linville (dismissed three months after conversion); Maura (dismissed four months after con-
version); Mowris (dismissed one month after conversion); Stanley (dismissed one month after conversion);
Stocker (dismissed eleven months after conversion); Wise (dismissed three months after conversion); cf. In
re Applegate, No. 10-16193 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 31, 2010) (after initial chapter 7 case was dismissed,
debtor filed second chapter 7 in which trustee filed motion to dismiss based on presumption of abuse and
debtor converted case to chapter 13, and chapter 13 was dismissed five months later; debtor filed a third
chapter 7 four months later and trustee did not file motion to dismiss).
220Goodall; Moose; Willis. Willis was actually filed as a chapter 13 case, converted to chapter 7 where
the trustee moved to dismiss based on the presumption of abuse, the debtor converted back to chapter 13,
and then converted back to chapter 7 where no motion to dismiss was made.
2'In re Carrillo, No. 11-20321 (Bankr. D. Ariz.Jul. 14, 2011); In re Witek, No. 08-31040 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio Mar. 10, 2008); In re Oliver, No. 07-12311 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2007); In re Ferando, No. 07-
81147 (Bankr. D. Neb. June 11, 2007); In re Singletary, No. 06-37257 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 26, 2006).
2221n re Pignotti, No. 11-02140 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa May 23, 2011).
2231n e Wilson, No. 15-30951 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Apr. 13, 2015); In re Showers, No. 09-35035 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. Aug. 4, 2009); In re Castle, No. 06-33130 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2006). Wilson was
subsequently converted to chapter 7 and the trustee declined to file a motion to dismiss.
224Fudge.
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
ter 11 where they theoretically can pay their unsecured creditors more than
those creditors would have received in the original chapter 7 case? Without
looking at the actual recoveries obtained by creditors in the converted cases, I
suggest that a successful outcome requires that (1) the chapter 7 case is con-
verted rather than dismissed because of the presumption of abuse (or, if it is
dismissed, the debtor then files a chapter 13 or chapter 11 case), and (2) the
chapter 13 or chapter 11 case into which it was converted is not subse-
quently dismissed or reconverted to chapter 7. Looking just at the cases in
this study in which the debtors attempted to rebut the presumption, and
applying this test of success, only 43 of the 129 cases in this study (one-third)
demonstrated a successful application of the means test.2 2 5
One might argue that the success of the means test is demonstrated not
only by the number of cases converted to chapter 13 or chapter 11 that
result in a discharge in the converted chapter, but in the number of cases that
are brought under chapter 13 or 11 in the first instance because the debtor
realizes that the means test will preclude relief in chapter 7. If the means test
has had that result, we should see that the filing rates for consumer 7 cases go
down significantly since the enactment of the means test in 2005. When we
look at the chapter 7 filings as a percentage of the total nonbusiness filings,226
we find that the percentage of nonbusiness filings made under chapter 7,
while declining slightly since 2010, has not changed dramatically since the
presumption of abuse was created. For the three months ended March 31,
2016, 62.6% of all nonbusiness filings were made under chapter 7.
22 5See Barker; Barraza; Campbell; Castle; Champagne; Darling; Dejoy; Delunas; Ervin; Fechter; Fonash;
Fudge; Harmon; Hartley; Herbert; Hurst; Inghilterra; Jackson; Kowal; Leggett; Lightsey; Mansfield; Patrick
Martin; Meade; Pageau; Patterson; Polkinghorn; Robinson; Rudnick; Samson; Earl Smith; Starkey; Strick-
land; Tauter; Thomas; Vaccariello; Wagner; Willson; Womer.
22 6These percentages were derived from Table F-2, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts - Business and Nonbusi-
ness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-Month Period Ending De-
cember 31, [of the applicable year], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/report-name/bankruptcy-filings.
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III. CONCLUSION
What are the implications of this study on the application of the rebutta-
ble presumption of abuse under § 707(b)(2)? The first conclusion that I
reach is that, although it is difficult to rebut the presumption of abuse, debt-
ors (and their attorneys) are missing an opportunity by not making an effort
to do so if there are circumstances that might support that claim. As previ-
ously mentioned, in most of the cases I found in which the trustee brought a
motion to dismiss based on the presumption of abuse, the debtor never at-
tempted to rebut the presumption by claiming special circumstances. That
makes the decision for the court an easy one. When debtors actually claim
special circumstances, in almost 20% of the cases they prevail before the
bankruptcy judge.
Second, if the debtor wishes to make the attempt to rebut the presump-
tion, the debtor should carefully comply with the procedural requirements of
§ 707(b)(2)(B)(ii), that is, present documentation with respect to the addi-
tional expense or adjustment to income and a detailed explanation of the spe-
cial circumstances that make the expense or income adjustment "necessary
and reasonable."227 The debtor must attest to the accuracy of that informa-
tion,2 28 and must ensure that, if the court accepts the debtor's arguments, the
debtor will be able to pass the means test.2 29 In thirty-five of the cases in
this study, the debtor failed to provide adequate documentation to substanti-
ate one or more of the adjustments the debtor sought,2 30 and in another
22711 U.S.C. § 707(bX2)(B)(iiXI) and (H).
22811 U.S.C. §707(bX2)(B)(iii).
22911 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)((iv).
2
oSee cases cited in note 159 supra.
2017) 433
434 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 91
eleven cases,231 the adjustments did not allow the debtor to pass the means
test. Procedural compliance is as important as satisfaction of the substantive
standard.
Finally, courts should recognize that the purpose behind the special cir-
cumstances doctrine was to allow debtors to remain in chapter 7 who had
'dire need" of chapter 7 relief.232 Those courts that apply the "narrow" inter-
pretation of "special circumstances" not only ignore the legislative history of
the phrase, but defeat the over-arching objective of the means test. Congress
intended to funnel a consumer debtor into a case commenced under the ap-
propriate chapter of the Bankruptcy Code to maximize creditor returns, not
to prevent that debtor from taking advantage of bankruptcy at all. If chapter
13 and chapter 11 are not realistic alternatives for a debtor, the court should
conclude that the debtor has "dire need" of chapter 7 relief. It is a simple
concept, but one many courts have failed to grasp.
23 See cases cited in note 160 supra.
2 32See text at note 184 supra.
